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DARE YOU SUE THE TAX COLLECTOR?  AN 
EMPIRICAL STUDY OF ADMINISTRATIVE LAWSUITS 
AGAINST TAX AGENCIES IN CHINA 
Ji Li † 
Abstract:  Though taxes are as certain as death, each year tens of thousands of 
people in the United States go to court to challenge their assessed tax liabilities, and 
many succeed.  By contrast, very few Chinese taxpayers litigate against tax agencies, and 
most of those who sue eventually settle, despite low formal litigation costs.  China’s non-
litigious culture does not fully explain the reluctance to sue, as courts in Taiwan 
adjudicate five times more lawsuits against tax agencies.  Judicial bias favoring 
government officials, weak enforcement of judgments against the state, and agency 
retaliation help to explain the aversion to litigate disputes with tax agencies in China.  
However, once the reluctance to sue is explained, the small amount of cases that go to 
trial constitutes a more intriguing puzzle.  Why would anyone in China insist on judicial 
resolution of disputes with powerful tax agencies, given the adverse conditions that have 
deterred hundreds of thousands of others from doing so?  This article offers a number of 
theoretical explanations that take into account the political and institutional context for 
both administrative litigation and tax administration in China.  People are more inclined 
to sue a tax agency when they have limited extractable resources, powerful allies in 
government, substantial interests in the dispute without alternative resolutions, or no 
expectation to interact with the agency in the future.  These explanations are evaluated 
and substantiated with an empirical analysis of all tax-related administrative lawsuits that 
went to trial from 2009 to 2011 in Henan Province, one of the most populous provinces 
in China.  These findings will contribute to the literature on Chinese tax administration, 
administrative litigation in China, and extant trial selection theories.  
I. INTRODUCTION  
 
Benjamin Franklin once said that only two things are certain in life: 
death and taxes.1  Apparently not all agree.  Each year tens of thousands of 
taxpayers in the United States go to court to challenge their assessed tax 
liabilities, and many succeed.  For example, more than 20,000 cases were 
filed at the U.S. Tax Court in 2003 against the Internal Revenue Service.2  
Around the same time period, more than seven thousand cases were filed at 
                                                      
† Assistant Professor, Rutgers Law School-Newark. The author thanks Susan Rose-Ackerman, Wei 
Cui, Yan Xu, Benjamin Liebman, Richard Cullen, Eric Ip, Eva Pils, Carl Minzner, Margaret Lewis, Taja-
Nia Henderson, John Leubsdorf, Stuart Deutsch, James Pope, Alan Hyde, Chrystin Ondersma, Christina Ho, 
Reid Weisbord, and other participants in the seminar at the Center for Rights and Justice of the Chinese 
University of Hong Kong, the Colloquium at Rutgers Law School-Newark, and the Chinese law seminar at 
Seton Hall Law School. The author may be contacted at jli@kinoy.rutgers.edu. 
1  BARTLETT’S FAMILIAR QUOTATIONS (Nathan Haskell Dole ed., 10th ed. 1919). 
2 Donald E. Tidrick, Inside the U.S. Tax Court: An Interview with the Honorable Judge Juan F. 
Vasquez, CPA, U.S. Tax Court, THE CPA J., http://www.nysscpa.org/cpajournal/2004/104/ 
text/p20.htm (last visited Jan. 24, 2013). 
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the New Jersey State Tax Court alone to challenge state and property taxes.3  
In addition, numerous cases are filed each year at U.S. district courts and the 
Federal Court of Claims for federal tax refunds.  In China, by contrast, a 
total of 405 cases were filed nationwide in 2011 against tax agencies4 and 
most of the cases were eventually settled, despite low formal litigation costs.  
The reluctance to sue cannot be easily attributed to cultural differences.  In 
Taiwan, a place sharing the same cultural attitudes towards litigation with 
Mainland China, 2520 cases against tax agencies were filed in 2010 at three 
regional high courts, six times that of the Mainland China, 5  whose 
population of roughly 1.3 billion dwarfs the approximately 23 million people 
living in Taiwan.6  
A structural analysis of the Chinese judiciary explains the puzzling 
reluctance to sue.  There is a shared understanding that local courts do not 
normally adjudicate administrative lawsuits against government agencies 
impartially and judicial bias is presumably more serious when powerful 
agencies, such as tax bureaus, are sued. 7   In rare cases where the 
complainant manages to obtain a favorable ruling against a defendant tax 
agency, he will still face daunting challenges in getting the ruling enforced.  
To further complicate the issue, agency retaliation will most likely follow 
any successful enforcement of the ruling.8  This article analyzes the high 
costs of taxpayer litigation due to the power and discretion enjoyed by 
Chinese tax agencies, which result in few people litigating tax disputes in 
China. 
The cases that go to trial, though small in number, constitute another 
intriguing empirical puzzle.  Why would anyone insist on judicial resolution 
of disputes with powerful tax agencies, given all the adverse conditions that 
deter thousands from doing so?  This article argues that tax agencies in 
China do not enjoy unlimited power.  The tax agencies’ jurisdiction is 
                                                      
3  TAX COURT OF NEW JERSEY, ANNUAL REPORT OF THE PRESIDING JUDGE OF THE TAX COURT OF 
NEW JERSEY, JULY 1, 2004-JUNE 30, 2005, 2 (2005) available at http://www.judiciary.state.nj.us/taxcourt/ 
acrobatpdf/tca2005.pdf. 
4 SUMMARY OF FIRST INSTANCE ADMINISTRATIVE LAWSUITS IN CHINA (2011), 
http://www.court.gov.cn/qwfb/sfsj/201206/P020120628451878418099.xls (last visited Aug. 27, 2012). 
5 Guoren Zhang, Shuiwu Xingzheng Susong Shenglu Jin 7.6% [Tax-Related Administrative 
Litigation Win Rate Only 7.6%], COMMERCIAL TIMES, (Oct. 15, 2010) http://www.deloitte. 
com/view/tc_TW/tw/pressroom/41939/2fa3d084af9a8210VgnVCM200000bb42f00aRCRD.htm . 
6  See CIA, China, THE WORLD FACTBOOK, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-
factbook/geos/ch.html (last visited Sept. 30, 2013) and CIA, Taiwan, THE WORLD FACTBOOK, 
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/tw.html (last visited Sept. 30, 2013) for 
the population figures of China and Taiwan, respectively. 
7  Kevin J. O’Brien & Lianjiang Li, Suing the Local State: Administrative Litigation in Rural China, 
51 THE CHINA J. 75, 75-76 (2004). 
8  Id. at 90. 
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territorial and their power is checked by other agencies of the state.  
Therefore, some taxpayers may avoid the heavy losses of agency retaliation 
if they expect only a one-time interaction with a tax agency, lack extractable 
resources, or have powerful allies in the local state.  For these taxpayers, 
administrative litigation is less costly and may be pursued if substantial 
interests are at stake and alternatives to litigation are unavailable.  In 
addition, as in the resolution of all disputes, high transaction costs and 
optimism may also contribute to the pursuit of administrative lawsuits 
against tax agencies in China.  
This article evaluates and substantiates these arguments with an 
empirical analysis of all tax-related administrative lawsuits that went to trial 
from 2009 to 2011 in Henan Province, one of the most populous provinces 
in China.  As far as the author is aware, this is the first study of Chinese 
administrative litigation that contains a substantive analysis of an unbiased 
sample of cases.9  The findings contribute to the literature on Chinese tax 
administration, administrative litigation in China, and trial selection theories.  
The article is divided into eight Parts.  Part II provides a brief survey 
of Chinese tax law and administration.  Part III introduces the institutions for 
state control of tax agents in China.  Part IV describes the puzzles about tax-
related administrative litigation and relevant literature.  Part V argues that 
factors such as limited extractable resources, the limited jurisdiction of tax 
agencies, substantial taxpayer interests, and lack of future interaction with a 
tax agency explain the puzzling persistence of tax litigation that goes to trial.  
Part VI evaluates and illustrates this argument by analyzing a dataset 
comprised of all tax-related administrative lawsuits from Henan Province 
(2009-2011).  Part VII discusses how the findings of this article contribute to 
existing literature.  Part VIII concludes by acknowledging the limitations of 
this study and making suggestions for future research. 
                                                      
9  For a sample of empirical research that discusses administrative litigation rates or plaintiff win 
rates, see Xin He & Yang Su, Do the “Haves” Come out Ahead in Shanghai Courts?, 10 J. EMPIRICAL 
LEGAL STUD. 120 (2013); Ji Li, Suing the Leviathan—an Empirical Analysis of the Changing Rate of 
Administrative Litigation in China, J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. (forthcoming 2013); Minxin Pei, Citizens v. 
Mandarins: Administrative Litigation in China, 152 THE CHINA Q. 832 (1997); Haibo He, 困顿的行政诉
讼 [Administrative Litigation in Trouble], 华东政法大学学报 [J. OF E. CHINA U. OF POL. SCI. & LAW] 86 
(2012). For a sample of research that contains substantive analysis of a selected sample of administrative 
cases, see O’Brien & Lianjiang Li, supra note 7; Qinghua Wang, Zhongguo Xingzheng Susong: 
Duozhongxin Zhuyi De Sifa [Administrative Litigation in China: Polycentric Adjudication], 19 ZHONGWAI 
FAXUE [PEKING U. L. J.] 513 (2007). For a sample of research that uses large-scale surveys to explore 
administrative litigation in China, see Jinhua Cheng, Institutional Options for the Settlement of 
Administrative Disputes in China: From the Perspective of Public Demand, SOC. SCI. IN CHINA 5 (2010); 
Pierre Landry, The Institutional Diffusion of Courts in China: Evidence from Survey Data, in RULE BY 
LAW: THE POLITICS OF COURTS IN AUTHORITARIAN REGIMES (Tom Ginsburg & Tamir Moustafa eds., 
2008). 
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II. THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA TAX LAW AND ADMINISTRATION 
 
Taxation is essential to the survival of any political regime, especially 
those of the managerial type.  The Chinese government, in order to provide 
basic public goods and achieve its policy objectives, established a wide 
variety of extractive institutions.10  This article focuses on the institutions for 
tax administration.  The state currently levies taxes on nineteen major 
categories.11  Since the tax reform of 1994, the extractive capacity of the 
central government has strengthened to the extent that it achieved an annual 
revenue growth of approximately 20% for the last decade, almost twice the 
rate of China’s GDP growth for the same period.12  
For purposes of maintaining political legitimacy, the nineteen taxes 
currently levied contain a number of progressive elements.  For instance, the 
People’s Republic of China (“P.R.C.”) Law on Individual Income Taxation 
sets the rate for the highest income bracket at 45%, much higher than the 3% 
rate for the lowest income bracket. 13   A recent amendment of the law 
exempts taxpayers with salary income of less than RMB 3500 from paying 
any income tax.14  Though the value-added tax (“VAT”) that accounts for a 
quarter of total government revenues is a regressive tax, the state has 
attempted to ameliorate its wealth effects on low-income individuals by, for 
example, reducing the VAT rates for household necessities.15 
The progressive elements, however, coexist with features that reflect 
the state’s efforts to garner support from constituencies of vested interests.  
For instance, the state does not levy any estate taxes.16  In addition, selected 
local governments only recently began to experiment with the collection of 
                                                      
10  One important institution is the property regime, which provides that urban land is owned by the 
state.  XIANFA art. X (1982).  Local governments in China have relied heavily on leasing of land use right 
to enrich their coffers.  See, e.g., Guining Yue, Lili Teng & Chunhua Wang, 我国地方政府“土地财政”问
题研究[Research on Local Governments’ “Land Finance” Problem],  144 开放导报[CHINA OPENING 
HERALD] 47, 48 (2009). 
11 The nineteen taxes include corporate income tax, individual income tax, value added tax, business 
tax, consumption tax, land appreciation tax, real estate tax, arable land occupation tax, urban land-use tax, 
stamp tax, custom duties, deed tax, vehicle acquisition tax, vehicle and vessel tax, resource tax, urban 
construction and maintenance tax, vessel tonnage tax and tobacco tax. 
12 STATE ADMINISTRATION OF TAXATION, CHINA TAXATION YEARBOOK  (2011). 
13 Chart for Marginal Tax Rates, 中华人民共和国个人所得税法[P.R.C. Law on Individual Income 
Taxation] (on file with author).   
14 Id. at art. 6, §1. 
15 Yan Xu, Putting the 'Value Added' in China's Vat, 58 TAX NOTES INT'L 487, 490 (2010). 
16 Shumin Guo, 遗产税应该尽快出台[For Immediate Enactment of Estate Tax], 中国房地产金融
[CHINA REAL EST. FIN.] 2 (2012).  
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real property taxes.17  Such tax benefits for the privileged contribute to the 
fast-growing wealth gap in China.18  
 




Data source: China Statistical Yearbook (2011). 
 
In the past three decades, the state constructed a powerful and rather 
sophisticated institutional apparatus for tax administration.  By the end of 
2010, tax bureaus of all levels employed more than 755,000 full-time and 
105,000 part-time agents.19  China is geographically administered, and the 
central government shares political power with regional governments.  The 
                                                      
17  Jing Zhang & Shuhui Huang, 房产税试点年内将扩容：地方草案加密上报[Experimentation 
with Property Taxes Will Expand by Year End: Local Governments Submit Drafts], 第一财经日报 [FIRST 
FIN. DAILY] (May 27, 2013), http://news.xinhuanet.com/fortune/2013-05/27/c_124766628.htm. 
18 The government refused to release the GINI coefficient, a statistical measure widely used to gauge 
wealth gap in a region. A 2005 study by the social science academy found the GINI coefficient to be 0.47 
(coefficients below 0.4 are generally considered reasonable level of wealth disparity).  See generally Xuyan 
Fang & Lea  Yu, Gov't Refuses to Release Gini Coefficient, CAIXINONLINE (Jan. 18, 2012) 
http://english.caixin.com/2012-01-18/100349814.html.  A recent study done by the Xinan University of 
Economics and Finance shows the GINI coefficient of 2010 to be 0.61, an extraordinarily high level. 
Survey said China in 2010 far exceeded the world average income gap, CAIXINONLINE (Dec. 10, 2012), 
http://china.caixin.com/2012-12-10/100470254.html. 
19 See STATE ADMINISTRATION OF TAXATION, SHUIWU GANBU DUIWU JIANSHE [DEVELOPMENT OF 
TAX ADMINISTRATION STAFF], http://www.chinatax.gov.cn/n8136506/n8136608/n8138877/n11897218/ 
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structure of the tax administration reflects that institutional arrangement.  
Among full-time tax agents, nearly half (357,000 by the end of 2010) work 
for tax agencies of regional governments.20  
As illustrated in Figure 2 below, the central government established a 
hierarchical ordering of tax administration.  Under the leadership of the 
national State Taxation Bureau (“STB”), offices were set up at the 
provincial, municipal, district, and county levels, in order of decreasing 
rank. 21   Parallel to the STB structure, each province also established a 
vertical ordering of tax administration, the Local Tax Bureau (“LTB”), with 
a provincial office at the top, subject to dual leadership of the STB and the 
provincial government.22  The former provides professional guidance and 
inter-provincial coordination and supervision, while the latter exercises 
direct leadership.23  Under the provincial bureau of the LTB are municipal 
and prefectural offices, which are of the same official rank, and the county 
LTB offices.24  These sub-provincial LTBs are subject to dual leadership of 
the higher ranking tax bureaus and the corresponding local governments, 
with the latter playing the primary supervisory and leadership role.25  Most 
of the tax bureaus set up outposts, branches, offices, information centers, and 
other specialized entities to assist in tax administration.26  By the end of 
2010, the STB system contained 3556 tax bureaus at various levels of 
administration, and 3414 inspection bureaus and direct branches, 10,193 
outposts and tax offices, and 4346 information centers and service centers.27  
Similarly, the LTB system consisted of 3055 regional tax bureaus at various 
levels of administration, 5186 investigation bureaus and direct branches, 
16,373 outposts and tax offices, and 2190 information centers and service 
centers. 28   Through such an extensive network of tax agents, the state 
                                                      
20 See STATE ADMINISTRATION OF TAXATION, STATE ADMINISTRATION OF TAXATION (2012), 
http://www.chinatax.gov.cn/n6669073/n6669133/6886063.html (last visited October 14, 2013). 
21  See STATE ADMINISTRATION OF TAXATION, SHUIWU ZUZHI JIGOU [ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE 
OF TAX ADMINISTRATION], http://www.chinatax.gov.cn/n8136506/n8136608/n8138877/n11897218/ 
11901206.html (last visited October 14, 2013). 
22  Id. 
23 Id.  To reflect fiscal policy preference favoring Tibet, China established no regional tax bureau in 
the region.  Id.  The STB and the LTB offices collect different types of taxes.  Id. The former is responsible 
for the collection of the VAT, consumption tax, automobile tax, business tax of certain SOEs, and so on.  Id.  
The regional tax bureaus collect business tax, corporate tax, personal income tax, etc.  Id.  Customs is 
responsible for collecting tariffs and certain other specific taxes.  Id.  
24  STATE ADMINISTRATION OF TAXATION, SHUIWU ZUZHI JIGOU [ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE OF 
TAX ADMINISTRATION], http://www.chinatax.gov.cn/n8136506/n8136608/n8138877/n118972181190120 
6.html (last visited Oct. 14, 2013). 
25  Id. 
26  Id. 
27 Id. 
28 Id. 
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achieved an annual revenue growth of approximately 20% in the past 
decade.29 
 
Figure 2: Structure of the P.R.C. Tax Administration.30 
 
The state empowers the agents to carry out their duties with a set of 
formal laws and regulations.  The fundamentals are laid down in the Law of 
the P.R.C. Concerning the Administration of Tax Collection. 31   Major 
substantive laws include the P.R.C. Law on Individual Income Taxation, the 
                                                      
29 CHINA STATISTICS BUREAU, CHINA STATISTICAL YEARBOOK, 8-1 (2011).  
30  STATE ADMINISTRATION OF TAXATION, SHUIWU ZUZHI JIGOU [ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE OF 
TAX ADMINISTRATION], http://www.chinatax.gov.cn/n8136506/n8136608/n8138877/n11897218/1190120 
6.html (last visited Oct. 14, 2013). 
31  Zhōnghuá Rénmín Gònghéguó Shuìshōu Zhēngshōu Guǎnlǐ Fǎ (中华人民共和国税收征收管理
法) [Tax Collection Management Law] (promulgated by the Ninth National People’s Congress, April 28, 
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P.R.C. Law on Enterprise Income Taxation, and the P.R.C. Law on Vehicle 
and Vessel Taxation.32   The P.R.C. Law on Legislation allows the State 
Council to make regulations regarding taxation not covered by the statutes in 
accordance with proper delegation from the National People’s Congress or 
its Standing Committee, 33  as well as regulations about statutory 
enforcement.34   It also allocates certain legislative power to government 
agencies such as the Ministry of Finance (“MOF”) and the STB.35  While the 
power to legislate tax regulations was delegated by the Standing Committee 
of the National People’s Congress (“SCNPC”) to the State Council, 
departmental rules about the interpretation and implementation of the tax 
regulations lack clear legislative delegation.36  As a result, the legality of the 
numerous normative rules issued and applied by the STB, the MOF, and the 
LTB is debatable.  Yet in practice the rules are largely accepted by taxpayers 
and tax professionals.37  The sheer volume and complexity of the normative 
documents probably contributes to the fact that Chinese taxpayers rely 
heavily on personal interpretations by tax agents to comply.38  Recently the 
national agencies have begun to rationalize tax rulemaking, especially the 
making and enforcement of normative rules.39 
 
III. CONTROLLING THE TAX AGENTS 
 
In order to collect enough revenue to meet its ever-increasing 
spending needs, the state empowers its tax agents and grants them wide 
discretion over tax administration.  Meanwhile, the state also implements a 
number of institutional measures to solve the inherent agency problem 
ubiquitous in a political system lacking freedom of press or a democratic 
check.  For the sake of clarity, the agency-controlled institutions are 
                                                      
32  STATE ADMINISTRATION OF TAXATION, SHUISHOU ZHIDU DE FALU JICI [THE RANKING OF LAWS 
CONCERNING TAX COLLECTION], http://www.chinatax.gov.cn/n8136506/n8136608/n8138877/n11897113/ 
11900938.html (last visited Oct. 14, 2013). 
33 Zhōnghuá Rénmín Gònghéguó Lìfǎ Fǎ (中华人民共和国立法法 ) [Law on Legislation] 
(promulgated by Ninth National People’s Congress, Third Session, effective March 15, 2000), art. 9 
http://news.xinhuanet.com/legal/2003-01/21/content_699610.htm.       
34  Id. at art. 56. 
35  Id. at art. 71. 
36 Wei Cui, What Is the “Law” in Chinese Tax Administration, 19 ASIA PAC. L. REV. 73, 75 (2011). 
37 Wei Cui, Two Paths for Developing Anti-Avoidance Rules in China, 17 ASIA PAC. TAX BULL. 1 
(2011). 
38  Id. at 2. 
39 Id. at 4. 
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categorized according to the Ginsburg typology:  hierarchy, second-party 
supervision, and third-party supervision.40  
Mechanisms in the first category, hierarchy, include positive sanctions 
(e.g., merit-based bonus and promotion) and negative sanctions (e.g., 
administrative punishment) within the agency, merit-based recruiting, 
regular study sessions, and so forth.41  For instance, since 2003 all candidates 
applying to work for the STB have been required to pass the highly 
competitive National Civil Servant Examination.42  
When hierarchical mechanisms fail to prevent, detect, and correct 
agency abuses, second-party supervision comes into play.  Two powerful 
institutions, the Communist Party of China Central Disciplinary Committee 
(“CDC”) and the Ministry of Supervision, which are charged with the 
responsibility to investigate and punish misconduct by government officials, 
are seriously under-staffed.43  Hence, their supervision is limited to high 
ranking government officials and they rarely implicate tax agents at the local 
level.44  The procuratorate may also function as an institution for second-
party supervision over tax agents and subject the more abusive ones to 
criminal punishment. 45   Adopted from former Soviet Union, the 
procuratorate may take the initiative to investigate official misconduct.46  
However, the discretion enjoyed by tax agents renders it difficult to 
distinguish routine exercise of discretion from illegal misconduct.  
To deal with the information asymmetry problem inherent in second-
party supervision, the state created third-party supervisory institutions that 
allow parties with private information about official misconduct to report it 
to the government.  Two examples are the letter and visit offices and the 
administrative reconsideration offices.47  The former, in spite of its long 
                                                      
40 TOM GINSBURG, RULE BY LAW: THE POLITICS OF COURTS IN AUTHORITARIAN REGIMES 61-63, 
(Tom Ginsburg & Tamir Moustafa, eds. 2008). 
41 Id. at 61. 
42  See STATE ADMINISTRATION OF TAXATION, SHUIWU GANBU DUIWU JIANSHE [ON DEVELOPING 
STATE ADMINISTRATION OF TAXATION STAFF], http://www.chinatax.gov.cn/n8136506/n8136608/ 
n8138877/n11897218/11901216.html (last visited July 26, 2013). 
43 Jiangnan Zhu, Officials’ Promotion Likelihood and Regional Variation of Corruption in China at 
83 (Dec. 2008) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Northwestern University) (on file with author). 
44 See, e.g.,北京地税局原局长王纪平被“双规[Director of Beijing LTB Was Under Shuanggui], 
XINHUA (May 6, 2010), http://news.xinhuanet.com/legal/2010-05/06/c_1275967.htm. 
45 The institution’s functions include prosecution of crimes and supervision of government and 
judicial officials.  See Zhōnghuá Rénmín Gònghéguó Jiǎnchá fǎ (中华人民共和国检察法) [Law on the 
Procuratorate] (promulgated by the Eighth National People’s Congress Standing Committee, Feb. 28, 1995, 
effective July 1, 1995), art. 6, http://www.china.com.cn/law/flfg/txt/200608/08/content _7063805.htm. 
46  Id. 
47  For a thorough description of the letter and visit offices, see Carl Minzner, Xinfang: An Alternative 
to Formal Chinese Legal Institutions, 42 STAN. J. INT'L L. 103 (2006). 
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history, have proved ineffective in resolving individual grievances.48  The 
latter are a relatively new institution.49 The State Council first enacted the 
Administrative Reconsideration Regulation (“ARR”) to facilitate the 
implementation of the Administrative Litigation Law (“ALL”), a 
groundbreaking statute that enabled Chinese citizens to bring government 
officials to court.50  The ARR was upgraded to a statute after a few years of 
trial implementation. 51   The legislature intended the administrative 
reconsideration regime to complement, not substitute, administrative 
litigation, so the procedure was designed to be informal, cost-free, and 
expedient.52  Citizens unsatisfied with any concrete administrative action 
may file a petition for reconsideration with a supposedly independent body 
lodged in the agency or a higher government body.53  Besides the legality of 
the challenged administrative act, the reconsideration body may review its 
                                                      
48 Id. at 106. 
49 In a very general sense, the administrative reconsideration mechanism resembles a typical 
administrative appeals institution in the United States. 
50 For a brief summary of the legislative history, see Randall Peerenboom, Globalization, Path 
Dependency and the Limits of Law: Administrative Law Reform and Rule of Law in the People's Republic 
of China, 19 BERKELEY J. INT'L L. 161, 191-92 (2001). 
51  See Zhōnghuá Rénmín Gònghéguó Xíngzhèng Fùyì Fǎ (中华人民共和国行政复议法) [Law on 
Administrative Reconsideration] (promulgated by the Ninth National People’s Congress Standing 
Committee, April 29, 1999, effective Oct. 1, 1999), http://www.gov.cn/banshi/2005-
08/21/content_25100.htm. 
52 For instance, complainants incur no cost to file a petition for administrative reconsideration.  
Zhōnghuá Rénmín Gònghéguó Xíngzhèng Fùyì Fǎ (中华人民共和国行政复议法) [Law on Administrative 
Reconsideration] (promulgated by the Ninth National People’s Congress Standing Committee, April 29, 
1999, effective Oct. 1, 1999) at art. 31, http://www.gov.cn/banshi/2005-08/21/content_25100.htm.  In 
addition, the reconsideration body is required to respond to a petition within 60 days after its filing.  Id.  
The filing may be done either in writing or orally, to accommodate those who are illiterate or are not 
accustomed to formal written complaints.  Id. at art. 11.  The procedure was designed to be informal and 
flexible.  
53 Petitions against bureaus of the STB are handled by the bureau at the next highest level.  See 
Shuìwù Xíngzhèng Fùyì Guīzé (税务行政复议规则) [Tax Rules for Administrative Reconsideration] 
(promulgated by the State Administration of Tax Bureau, Dec. 15, 2009, effective April 1, 2010), 
http://www.chinatax.gov.cn/n8136506/n8136593/n8137537/n8138502/9563669.html.  Petitions against an 
office of the LTB may be filed with either the corresponding local government or the bureau of a higher 
rank, unless otherwise stipulated by regional rules.  Petitions against the STB in Beijing may be filed with 
the bureau itself.  Petitions should in general be filed, orally or in writing, within 60 days after knowledge 
of the concrete administrative action.  Relevant administrative reconsideration body should review a 
petition within five days of its filing and decide whether to accept it.  Rejection may be based on a limited 
number of situations such as nonpayment of the disputed tax liabilities and fines.  Once accepted, a petition 
should be directed to the responding party, which carries the burden of proof.  The administrative 
reconsideration body shall conduct investigation and render a decision within 60 days of the acceptance of 
the petition.  An additional 30 days may be granted if the case is complex.  For disputes over the exercise of 
discretion by tax agents or matters over the reasonableness of certain administrative action, reconciliation 
and mediation are allowed.  The reconsideration body may uphold the administrative action, amend it, or 
withdraw it after determining its illegality, in which case it should order the responding party to take new 
administrative action in accordance with the law.  Id.   
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appropriateness and the legality of relevant agency rules,54 both of which fall 
beyond the jurisdiction of typical courts. 
Once taxpayers have exhausted administrative recourse for disputes 
over a tax matter, they may turn to the courts.55  The defendant agency 
generally bears the burden to prove the challenged administrative action was 
carried out in accordance with law. 56   If the court deems the evidence 
insufficient, it may conduct its own investigation.57  Under current law, a 
judgment or decision must be rendered within three months after the 
docketing of an administrative lawsuit, and unsatisfied parties may appeal 
the trial decisions to a higher court.58  
In sum, the Chinese government has over the years enacted a whole 
set of substantive and procedural laws and regulations over tax 
administration, and has constructed an administrative law regime to rein in 
abusive government officials.  Though the resulting legal framework 
contains some elements that appear more favorable to tax agencies—e.g., 
payment of the purported tax liability is required for initiating the 
administrative reconsideration procedure59—it should provide a reasonable 
institutional protection to Chinese citizens against abusive tax agents or 
misinterpretation of tax laws and regulations.60 
 
IV. EMPIRICAL PUZZLES AND EXTANT LITERATURES 
 
While the state has set up a rather comprehensive legal framework to 
restrain government agencies and to protect Chinese taxpayers, very few 
taxpayers have chosen to use this legal framework.61  According to recent 
                                                      
54 Zhōnghuá Rénmín Gònghéguó Shuìshōu zhēngshōu guǎnlǐ fǎ (中华人民共和国税收征收管理法) 
[Tax Collection Management Law] (promulgated by the Ninth National People’s Congress, effective May 
1, 2001), art. 35, http://www.gov.cn/banshi/2005-08/31/content_146791.htm. 
55 Id. at art. 88. 
56 Zhōnghuá Rénmín Gònghéguó Xíngzhèng Sùsòng Fǎ (中华人民共和国行政诉讼法 ) 
[Administrative Procedure Law] (promulgated by the Seventh National people’s Congress, April 4, 1989, 
effective Oct. 1, 1990), art. 32. 
57 Id. at art. 34. 
58 Id. at art. 57. 
59 Shuìwù Xíngzhèng Fùyì Guīzé (税务行政复议规则 ) [Tax Rules for Administrative 
Reconsideration] (promulgated by State Administration of Taxation Dec. 15, 2009, effective April 1, 2010), 
ch. 6. 
60 Wei Cui, supra note 37, at 5.  
61 From 1994 to 2005, courts nationwide received merely 1,399 lawsuits against tax agencies, an 
average of 120 cases per year.  See Jingjing Chen, Shuiwu Xingzheng Anjian Liunian Fanfan, Nanshuiren 
Xiguan Falu Jiuji Shouduan [Administrative Cases Double in Six Years, Taxpayers Used to Legal 
Remedies] LEGAL DAILY, Feb. 7, 2007.  Another source, however, reports a much larger number (6,154 
cases from 1996 to 1999).  See HARBIN MUNICIPAL LOCAL TAXATION BUREAU, SHUI WU XINGZHENG FU 
VI SHI WU ZHONG DE WENTI VU DUICE (税务行政复议实务中的问题与对策) [ISSUES AND SOLUTIONS IN 
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data published by the Supreme People’s Court (“SPC”), out of 136,353 first 
instance administrative lawsuits filed in all Chinese courts in 2011, only 405 
were against tax agencies.62  Among the 399 cases that were closed by the 
end of the year, 279 were concluded without reaching any substantive issues, 
and the courts issued decisions not judgments.  Of the 279 decisions, 225 
were court approvals for plaintiffs to withdraw their complaints, and twenty 
five cases were dismissed without a trial.63  Of the mere 120 cases where 
courts rendered judgments on substantive legal issues, defendant tax 
agencies prevailed in 106 cases and plaintiffs in only fourteen, a victory rate 
of 11.7%.64  
To the uninitiated, it must be puzzling that taxpayers in China avoid 
judicial resolution of tax disputes to such a great extent.  The next part 
explains the unusual reluctance to sue.  However, the explanations will at the 
same time unveil a more intriguing puzzle:  why does any tax-related lawsuit 
go to trial at all, given all the factors that have turned thousands of taxpayer 
disputants away from judicial resolution? 
 
A. The First Puzzle: Why Are Potential Litigants Reluctant to Sue? 
 
To scholars familiar with administrative litigation in China, reluctance 
to sue government agencies is hardly a puzzle.  Here it is posed as such 
mostly to set up the context for the discussion of the next empirical question:  
who, and under what circumstances, sues the tax bureau—arguably one of 
the most powerful agencies in China.  
When asked to comment on administrative litigation, a Chinese 
businessman made the following comment:  “It is very unlikely that I will 
win a lawsuit against the government.  Even if I won in court, I would then 
risk losing everything.” 65   This comment reflects a widely-shared 
                                                                                                                                                              
THE PRACTICE OF TAX ADMINISTRATIVE RECONSIDERATION] (Oct. 24, 2008), 
http://www.chinalaw.gov.cn/article/xzfy/llyj/200811/20081100066707.shtml. 
62 SUMMARY OF FIRST INSTANCE ADMINISTRATIVE LAWSUITS IN CHINA (2011), 
http://www.court.gov.cn/qwfb/sfsj/201206/P020120628451878418099.xls (last visited Aug. 27, 2012). 
63  Id. 
64 One source cites the victory rate of all cases filed between 1994 and 2005 to be 45%.  See Hong 
Lan, Shuiwu Xingzheng Anjianshu Cheng Shangsheng Qushi [Trend of Increase for Tax-Related 
Administrative Cases], ZHONGGUO SHUIWU BAO [CHINA TAX'N] (Feb., 5 2007).  See also Wei Cui, The 
Rule of Law in Chinese Tax Administration, in THE DELICATE BALANCE: TAX, DISCRETION AND THE RULE 
OF LAW 362-63, (Chris  Evans, et al., 2011). The STB's high plaintiff victory rate may include cases 
withdrawn by the plaintiffs after the defendants had changed their administrative acts. Or it may just be 
figures from a few years ago, before the national campaign for ADRs. 
65 Qian Wang & Xuena Li, Jie Qiye Er Yu,( 竭企业而渔) [Destroying Tax Basis by Overtaxing 
Companies] XIN SHI JI [NEW CENTURY MAG.] (Aug. 27, 2012), http://magazine.caixin.com/2012-08-
24/100428102.html. 
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understanding and explains why most taxpayers choose not to sue tax 
agencies when disputes arise.  In theory, litigation is a preferred method for 
dispute resolution if and only if its benefits outweigh its costs and the net 
benefits outweigh those of other alternative dispute resolution methods 
(including not doing anything at all). 66   
From the viewpoint of welfare maximization, when litigation costs are 
high, rational disputants should agree to settle and split the cost savings.  In 
the United States, expensive legal fees probably deter many from suing.  
This deterrence does not directly apply in China because the formal costs for 
administrative lawsuits are low.  As noted earlier, the administrative law 
regime was established in part to encourage information-holders to assist the 
state in monitoring local agents.  So under current law, the court fee for 
filing an administrative case is merely RMB 50 (USD 7.5).67  In addition, the 
defendant government agency generally bears the burden of proof in 
administrative lawsuits.68  Finally, relatively low attorneys’ fees make the 
assistance of legal counsel affordable to many, though evidence shows that 
Chinese lawyers tend to avoid representing cases against the state.69  The low 
formal litigation costs in China suggest that the deterrent to suing the state 
lies elsewhere.   
Judicial weakness and bias favoring state agencies and high costs of 
agency retaliation explain the strong reluctance to file lawsuits against tax 
agencies in China.  Judicial weakness and bias in administrative litigation is 
not a new concept to scholars of Chinese law and politics.70  Courts in China 
are reluctant to challenge the local officials who control court funding and 
major personnel decisions. 71   When adjudicating administrative lawsuits, 
pragmatic Chinese judges consider the potential impact of their rulings on 
local stability and the compliance costs for the local government.72  The 
tactic often employed is to dodge difficult cases. 73  Because of judicial 
                                                      
66 For the sake of clarity, responses to a grievance against a state agency can be grouped into three 
categories:  1) lumping it (bearing the loss without protesting), 2) negotiating a settlement or protesting 
through other non-judicial channels, and 3) litigating against the agency. 
67 Susongfei Jiaona Banfa (诉讼费用交纳办法) [Measures Regarding Payment of Litigation Fee]  
(promulgated by the St. Council, Dec. 19, 2006, effective April 1, 2007), art. 13, § 5, 
http://www.gov.cn/zwgk/2006-12/29/content_483407.htm. 
68 Zhōnghuá Rénmín Gònghéguó Xíngzhèng Sùsòng Fǎ (中华人民共和国行政诉讼法 ) 
[Administrative Procedure Law] (promulgated by the Seventh National people’s Congress, April 4, 1989, 
effective Oct. 1, 1990), art. 32. 
69 Ji Li, supra note 9, at 22. 
70  See Xin He & Yang Su, supra note 9; O’Brien & Lianjiang Li, supra note 7. 
71 Benjamin L. Liebman, China's Courts: Restricted Reform, 191 THE CHINA Q. 620, 627 (2007). 
72 Qinghua Wang, supra note 9, at 525. 
73 Id. at 525-26.  See also, Xin He, The Judiciary Pushes Back: Law, Power, and Politics in Chinese 
Courts, in JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE IN CHINA: LESSONS FOR GLOBAL RULE OF LAW PROMOTION (R. P. 
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weakness, litigants have to resort to multiple mechanisms, such as media and 
mass protest, to pressure judges to accept and adjudicate administrative 
lawsuits fairly.74  Of course, not all government agencies are treated equally.  
Judges tend to be more inclined to rule in accordance with the law if the 
defendant is a weak administrative agency and the unfavorable decision 
would not negatively impact its interests.75  In contrast, when a case touches 
upon critical interests of powerful administrative agencies, the court will try 
to avoid registering the case or ruling against the defendant.76  Even if the 
plaintiff manages to obtain a favorable ruling in court, the subsequent 
enforcement is at best uncertain.  Powerful state agencies face a low risk of 
punishment for delaying or refusing to comply with judgments against their 
interests.77  
In the rare case where the plaintiff in an administrative lawsuit wins in 
court and is able to enforce the judgment, agency retaliation will most likely 
follow.78  The costs and damages of such retaliation, if from a tax agency, are 
substantial.  To ensure revenue collection, the state grants local tax agents 
wide discretion to implement tax laws and policies.  Consequently, disguised 
retaliation is of low risk for the agents, but costly for the targeted ex-
plaintiff.  For instance, a tax agency may retaliate by conducting more 
inspections and audits of the taxpayer’s books, causing excessive delays in 
processing the taxpayer’s requests, over-assessing taxpayer’s revenues or 
profits, and issuing harsh penalties for tax deficiencies.79   
Typical business practices in China also contribute to the high costs of 
agency retaliation.  Formality is not highly valued in small business 
                                                                                                                                                              
Peerenboom ed., 2010).  Until recently, local courts could dodge administrative lawsuits by not acting on it.  
Rejecting it outright would enable the complainant to appeal the case to a higher court, so the case filing 
division could choose not to do anything about a complaint.  A recent SPC rule was intended to solve this 
problem.  Complainants are now allowed to bring a lawsuit directly to a higher court if the first instance 
court ignores the filing. 
74 See, e.g., O’Brian & Lianjiang Li, supra note 9, at 82. 
75 Xing Ying & Zuo Xu, Case Registration Politics and the Stagnation of Administrative Litigation: 
An Empirical Study of Two Northern China Basic Courts, 6 TRIB. OF POL. SCI. & L. 111, 117 (2009). 
76 Id. at 116-18. 
77 See O’Brian & Lianjiang Li, supra note 9, at 90.  However, some empirical evidence indicates that 
the enforcement of court judgment in civil cases is better than generally expected.  See Xin He, Debt 
Collection in the Less Developed Regions of China: An Empirical Study from a Basic-Level Court in 
Shaanxi Province, 206 THE CHINA Q. 253 (2011). 
78 See HARBIN MUNICIPAL LOCAL TAXATION BUREAU, supra note 61. 
79 The statute in general stipulates penalties in the range of 50% to 500% of the assessed tax 
deficiency, and the agency has the discretion to decide the exact percentage.  See Zhōnghuá Rénmín 
Gònghéguó Shuìshōu Zhēngshōu Guǎnlǐ Fǎ (中华人民共和国税收征收管理法 ) [Tax Collection 
Management Law] (promulgated by the Ninth National People’s Congress, April 28, 2001, effective May 1, 
2001), ch. 1, art. 1-2, http://www.gov.cn/banshi/2005-08/31/content_146791.htm. 
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transactions between Chinese companies. 80   A large number of small 
businesses pay presumptive taxes.81  Jeopardizing a cooperative relationship 
with a tax agency will presumably result in higher tax assessments.  In 
addition, many businesses engage in some form of tax evasion.82  A good 
relationship with local tax agents ensures that agents ignore the tax evasion.  
Such a practice, however, allows tax agencies to easily retaliate against 
businesses if the agencies ever choose to strictly enforce relevant tax laws.83  
Because the actual tax burden of a Chinese taxpayer depends on his or her 
relationship with tax collectors,84 few would jeopardize that relationship by 
challenging the collectors in court.  
Moreover, most Chinese firms are well aware of the importance of a 
good relationship with tax agents and will actively cultivate and maintain 
one.  An empirical study found that Chinese companies constantly set aside 
a significant portion of their business expenses as “money bribes to 
government officials in exchange for lower expropriation.” 85   Chinese 
companies also engage in frequent personal interactions with local tax 
agents to obtain information about tax law enforcement. 86   All these 
precautions reduce the probability of disputes arising in the first place. 
Systemic reforms aimed at easing social tensions further reduce the 
filing of administrative lawsuits. 87   These reforms strengthened 
administrative reconsideration institutions and encouraged mediation at 
every phase of the litigation procedure.88  Chinese courts even implemented 
target responsibility systems to increase the rate of mediation for civil and 
administrative litigation. 89   In the context of this national campaign to 
promote non-judicial dispute resolution, most of the administrative lawsuits 
against tax agencies, once docketed, must be actively mediated by the 
courts.  If the mediation efforts succeed, the taxpayer will withdraw his 
complaint and the case closes.  Otherwise, the lawsuit will go to trial.  Even 
throughout the trial process, the judge will press the parties to settle before 
                                                      
80 See Max Boisot & John Child, From Fiefs to Clans and Network Capitalism: Explaining China's 
Emerging Economic Order, 41 ADMIN. SCI. Q. 600, 612-13 (1996). 
81 Wei Cui, The Prospect of New Partnership Taxation in China, 46 TAX NOTES INT'L. 625, 630 
(2007). 
82 See Qian Wang & Xuena Li, supra note 65. 
83 Id. 
84 Hongbin Cai, et al., Eat, Drink, Firms, Government: An Investigation of Corruption from the 
Entertainment and Travel Costs of Chinese Firms, 54 J.L. & ECON. 55, 63 (2011). 
85 Id. at 66. 
86 Wei Cui, supra note 37, at 3. 
87 See generally, Carl Minzner, China's Turn Against Law, 59 AM. J. COMP. L. 935 (2011). 
88 Xing Ying & Zuo Xu, supra note 75, at 120. 
89 Minzner, supra note 87, at 957. 
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issuing a decision or judgment.90  Thus, any administrative lawsuit filed 
against a tax agency filters through a number of institutions that are designed 
to provide non-judicial resolution. 
In sum, judicial weakness and bias in favor of the state, high costs of 
agency retaliation, and the state campaign to promote alternative dispute 
resolutions determine that, when disputes arise between taxpayers and local 
tax officials, the former tend to show a high level of tolerance.  If any action 
is taken, it is likely directed towards non-judicial dispute resolution.  As a 
result, only a few hundred administrative lawsuits are filed each year against 
tax agencies in China. 
 
B. The Second Puzzle: Why Does Anyone Sue and Insist on a Trial?  
 
Given the state campaign to promote alternative dispute resolution, 
judicial bias, and the high cost of agency retaliation, the existence of any 
tried cases is an intriguing puzzle.  Why does anyone in China go through 
the adjudicatory process to resolve disputes with powerful tax agencies, 
given the adverse conditions?  The answer to this question is of critical 
importance to the understanding of tax administration in China, the 
development of its administrative law regime, and more generally China’s 
legal reform.   
Questions about the selection of lawsuits for trial have generated a 
vast amount of literature. 91   Assuming litigation is more costly than 
settlement, all lawsuits should settle but for transaction costs or information 
asymmetry.  Further, those lawsuits that go to trial are neither a random nor 
a representative sample of all the lawsuits.  According to the classic model 
developed by Professors George L. Priest and Benjamin Klein (“Priest/Klein 
model”), after satisfying certain assumptions, lawsuits will only be tried if 
they are “close cases,” and plaintiffs will have approximately a 50% win 
rate.92  Systematic deviation from the 50% rate may occur if:  1) litigation 
costs are low relative to settlement costs, 2) plaintiffs expect judgments to be 
high relative to litigation costs (encouraging litigation for a high proportion 
                                                      
90 Xing Ying & Zuo Xu, supra note 75, at 119. 
91 See George L. Priest & Benjamin Klein, The Selection of Disputes for Litigation, 13 J. LEGAL 
STUD. 1 (1984); Donald Whittman, Dispute Resolution, Bargaining, and the Selection of Cases for Trial: A 
Study of the Generation of Biased and Unbiased Data, 17 J. LEGAL STUD. 313 (1988); Theodore Eisenberg, 
Testing the Selection Effect: A New Theoretical Framework with Empirical Tests, 19 J. LEGAL STUD. 337 
(1990). 
92 See Priest & Klein, supra note 91, at 17. 
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of disputes), or 3) the two parties have different stakes in the litigation’s 
outcome.93  
One notable alternative theory, the asymmetric information model, 
loosens the implicit assumption of the Priest/Klein model that disputants are 
equally informed.94  Because the disputants hold asymmetric information 
and the informed party offers to settle only when it expects to lose at trial, 
the informed party should prevail in most tried cases.95  So in contrast to the 
Priest/Klein model, the asymmetric information model does not predict a 
general tendency of 50% win rate.96  Instead, the more informed party should 
have a much higher victory rate.  
In the past three decades, the Priest/Klein model and alternative 
theories have spawned numerous empirical studies.97  U.S. Tax Court cases 
are ideal for testing these theories because the judgments of both settled and 
tried civil tax controversy cases are disclosed to the public.  One study found 
divergent expectations to be a critical factor in determining the likelihood of 
settlement, and active judges will facilitate the meeting of such expectations 
and minimize strategic behavior by the disputants.98  However, taxpayers’ 
risk preference and the use of legal counsel show no significant impact on 
the settlement of tax court cases.99  
Very few empirical studies have touched on why administrative 
lawsuits go to trial in China.  The most notable study is Professor Pei 
Minxin’s article in 1995, which found both parties to an administrative 
dispute had incentives to settle.100  According to the study, plaintiffs suing 
government officials in China expect to lose and are better off settling with 
the defendants.101  The sued government agencies are also threatened by the 
small possibility of losing in court, which would harm not only government 
authority but, more importantly, the career prospect of responsible 
                                                      
93 Id. at 20. 
94 Id. at 24-29. 
95 Joel Waldfogel, Reconciling Asymmetric Information and Divergent Expectations Theories of 
Litigation, 41 J.L. & ECON. 451, 452 (1998). 
96 See Steven Shavell, Any Frequency of Plaintiff Victory at Trial Is Possible, 25 J. LEGAL STUD. 493 
(1996); Waldfogel, supra note 95. 
97 See Daniel Kessler, et al., Explaining Deviations from the Fifty-Percent Rule: A Multimodal 
Approach to the Selection of Cases for Litigation, 25 J. LEGAL STUD. 233(1996); Eisenberg, supra note 91; 
Daniel Klerman, The Selection of 13th-Century Disputes for Litigation, 9 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 320 
(2012); Samuel R. Gross & Kent D. Syverud, Getting to No: A Study of Settlement Negotiations and the 
Selection of Cases for Trial, 90 MICH. L. REV. 319 (1991). Most of these studies use evidence from the 
United States.  
98 Leandra Lederman, Which Cases Go to Trial?, 49 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 315, 341 (1999). 
99 Id. 
100  Minxin Pei, supra note 9, at 844. 
101  Id. 
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officials.102  As a result, defendant government agencies are incentivized to 
settle as well.103  In addition, Chinese courts—stuck between the conflicting 
interests of maintaining their institutional legitimacy and protecting the 
interests of state agencies—are equally enthusiastic about settlement. 104  
Given the stakes implicated by non-judicial resolution of administrative 
disputes, a significant proportion of plaintiffs in Pei’s empirical study settled 
and withdrew their complaints.105  Pei also compared the defendant win rates 
in administrative lawsuits against different government agencies and 
concluded that powerful agencies enjoy greater advantages in administrative 
litigation.106  
In reaching this conclusion, Pei neglected the Priest/Klein theory and 
failed to address the causes of the deviation from the 50% plaintiff victory 
rate.  In addition, Pei’s study centered on a sample of 236 administrative 
cases that were published in the early 1990s as model precedents for judges 
and lawyers, creating a problem of selection bias.107  Moreover, the study 
provided a survey of several general attributes of the cases—such as who 
were the plaintiffs, who was sued, and who prevailed—without reaching into 
the substance and contexts of the lawsuits.108  Therefore, it fails to explain 
why a portion of the cases went to trial in spite of all the unfavorable 
conditions for administrative litigation recognized in the study.   
Other empirical works of administrative litigation in China relied on 
either a small number of non-random cases and interviews or a large-scale 
social survey.109   Both methodologies are flawed with the selection bias 
problem.  And most of the studies cover administrative lawsuits against all 
government agencies.110  It is widely recognized that all state agencies are 
not equal in the highly fragmented authoritarian regime, with powerful ones 
enjoying more advantages in court.111  By treating all government defendants 
the same, existing studies miss this important aspect of Chinese politics.   
In sum, existing literature does not sufficiently explain why some tax-
related administrative lawsuits reach the trial stage despite the nationwide, 
state campaign for settlement, high costs of government retaliation, little 
chance of victory, and low possibility of enforcement of any favorable 
                                                      
102  Id. 
103 Id. 
104  Id. at 844-45. 
105 Id. at 842-45. 
106 Id. at 845. 
107 Id. at 847-48. 
108  Id. at 851. 
109 See sources cited supra note 9. 
110  See sources cited supra note 9. 
111 Xing Ying & Zuo Xu, supra note 75, at 116-18. 
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judgments.  The next part sets out to answer the intriguing empirical 
question.  
 
V. MAKING SENSE OF THE “IRRATIONAL” ADMINISTRATIVE LAWSUITS 
AGAINST TAX AGENCIES IN CHINA 
 
This part discusses four main factors that contribute to the trial of 
certain lawsuits against powerful tax agencies:  1) immunity to extra-judicial 
retaliation; 2) substantial stake and lack of alternative dispute resolution; 3) 
high transaction costs; and 4) optimism of the disputants.  
As discussed earlier, though formal litigation costs are insignificant in 
China, extra-judicial costs, i.e., the costs of agency retaliation, tend to be 
substantial for those who take government officials to court, which results in 
only a few lawsuits against tax agencies.  The critical role of agency 
retaliation in deterring lawsuits, however, also explains why complainants 
who may avoid the costs will be able to significantly reduce the actual 
litigation costs and be more incentivized to sue.  
Tax agencies in China, though powerful, are subject to certain 
restraints.  First, their jurisdiction is territorial.112  A tax agency enjoys wide 
discretion in tax administration within its own territory, but crossing the line 
into another agency’s jurisdiction significantly curtails this discretion.  
Because of this limit on a local tax agency’s power, a complainant may 
avoid retaliation costs if she moves her taxable assets away from the 
agency’s jurisdiction and does not interact with the agency again after the 
lawsuit.  Second, the exercise of local tax agencies’ monitoring, 
investigative, and extractive authority and discretion is largely restricted to 
taxable income and assets.113  Therefore, individuals and companies with 
low incomes and revenues are relatively immune to the agencies’ retaliation 
threats.  Third, the authoritarian regime of China is highly fragmented,114 so 
having a powerful ally in the political system significantly reduces the 
probability of tax agency retaliation.   
While retaliation costs may be curbed in these limited circumstances, 
persistence in continuing to trial would not exist without an expectation of 
high returns.  Put differently, a lawsuit will more likely be tried if substantial 
                                                      
112  See supra Part II for a discussion about the system for tax administration in China. 
113  Zhōnghuá Rénmín Gònghéguó Shuìshōu Zhēngshōu Guǎnlǐ Fǎ (中华人民共和国税收征收管理
法) [Tax Collection Management Law] (promulgated by the Ninth National People’s Congress, April 28, 
2001, effective May 1, 2001), http://www.gov.cn/banshi/2005-08/31/content_146791.htm. 
114 For a detailed discussion of the concept of fragmented authoritarian regime, see KENNETH 
LIEBERTHAL & MICHEL OKSENBERG, POLICY MAKING IN CHINA : LEADERS, STRUCTURES, AND PROCESSES 
137-51 (1988). 
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interests are at stake and alternative dispute resolution channels are 
unavailable.  Expectation of positive return depends first of all on a positive 
probability of winning a lawsuit.  For the following reasons, such positive 
probability may exist in spite of the serious judicial bias discussed earlier.  
Though plaintiffs of administrative lawsuits are very likely to lose at the trial 
level,115 it is possible to win upon appeal.  Appellate courts tend to be less 
influenced by defendant government agencies.116  Plaintiffs in administrative 
lawsuits therefore expect a better chance of obtaining favorable judgments at 
the appellate level. 
A unique institutional feature of the Chinese legal system, the lack of 
judicial finality, further improves the plaintiffs’ chance of obtaining an 
eventual victory.  Though in general appellate decisions are final, in certain 
circumstances they may be further challenged.  The procuratorate may lodge 
a protest of a legally binding decision to a higher court on numerous 
grounds, such as erroneous application of the law by judges.117  For reasons 
similar to other second-party supervisory institutions, only a very few 
administrative cases are processed by the procuratorate each year.118  Other 
possible channels to challenge an appellate decision include directly 
petitioning a higher court to intervene and retry the case or petitioning the 
deciding appellate court to reopen the case.119  Such intervention is more 
likely if the higher court faces external pressure from the legislature,120 
ranking government officials,121 or public media.122  In sum, due to the lack 
of adjudicatory finality and the possibility of prevailing when higher 
authorities intervene, plaintiffs in a suit against tax agents may try a losing 
case and then appeal if substantial interests are at stake.  Readers should note 
that the discussion of this and the preceding paragraph is only to show that 
                                                      
115 Xin He & Yang Su, supra note 9, at 132. 
116  Minxin Pei, supra note 9, at 847. 
117 See Zhōnghuá Rénmín Gònghéguó Xíngzhèng Sùsòng Fǎ (中华人民共和国行政诉讼法 ) 
[Administrative Procedure Law] (promulgated by the Seventh National people’s Congress, April 4, 1989, 
effective Oct. 1, 1990), art. 64. 
118 For example, from 2008 to 2011, Zaozhuang Intermediate Procuratorate lodged 122 protests, but 
only one was for an administrative lawsuit.  See Jiang Yang (姜洋), Lun Kangsu Zaishen Anjian De Tedian, 
Nandian Ji Jianyi (论抗诉再审案件的特点、难点及建议) [On the Features, Difficulties and Suggestions 
Regarding Protest-Triggered Retrial Cases], CIVIL PROCEDURE LAW (June 17, 2012), 
http://www.civilprocedurelaw.cn/html/jcjd_1174_2538.html. 
119 Zhōnghuá Rénmín Gònghéguó Xíngzhèng Sùsòng Fǎ (中华人民共和国行政诉讼法 ) 
[Administrative Procedure Law] (promulgated by the Seventh National people’s Congress, April 4, 1989, 
effective Oct. 1, 1990), art. 62. 
120  See Young Nam Cho, Symbiotic Neighbour or Extra-Court Judge? The Supervision over Courts 
by Chinese Local People's Congresses, 176 THE CHINA Q. 1068, 1073-77 (2003). 
121  See Liebman, supra note 71, at 626-27. 
122  See id. at 628-29. 
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the probability of post-trial victory is positive, not zero.  As will be 
illustrated in the next part, appellate courts rarely reverse lower court 
decisions favoring a strong state agency.  In other words, the probability of 
winning an administrative lawsuit, at trial and afterwards, is positive but 
very low, so plaintiffs will insist on trial only if substantial interests are at 
stake.    
In sum, while the high extra-judicial costs of suing tax agencies 
explain the small number of administrative lawsuits filed each year, they 
also explain why those that do not bear the costs may persist on going to trial 
for a reasonable amount of material rewards.  Moreover, substantial stake 
and lack of alternative dispute resolution may also explain why some cases 
fail to settle.  The theoretical explanations specific to China’s political legal 
context do not necessarily conflict with general selection theories.  High 
transaction costs and optimism of the disputants should also contribute to the 
filing of lawsuits against tax agencies in China.   
The next part examines these theories against the results from 
administrative lawsuits against tax agencies in Henan Province from 2009 to 
2011. 
 
VI. ANALYSIS OF TAX-RELATED ADMINISTRATIVE LAWSUITS FROM HENAN 
PROVINCE 
 
This part evaluates and substantiates the theoretical explanations 
proposed in Part V with an analysis of all of the major administrative cases 
against tax agencies that went to trial in Henan Province from 2009 to 2011.  
The author selected Henan Province for the following reasons.  First and 
foremost, the province took the lead in publishing court decisions and 
judgments.  In response to a SPC rule about case disclosure,123 the Henan 
                                                      
123 As part of the judicial reform, the SPC published the Six Rules on the Disclosure of Judgments 
and the Measures on the Publication of Judgments Online, both of which encourage public disclosure of 
court decisions and judgments, but also provide three general categories of non-publication: national 
security, privacy and adolescent crimes.  See Guanyu Sifa Gongkai De Liu Xiang Guiding (关于司法公开
的六项规定) [Six Rules on the Disclosure of Judgments] (promulgated by the Sup. People’s Ct., Dec. 8, 
2009, effective Dec. 8, 2009), para. 5, http://www.chinanews.com/gn/news/2009/12-23/2034717.shtml; 
Zuigao Renmin Fayuan Guanyu Renmin Fayuan Zai Hulianwang Gongbu Caipan Wenshu De Guiding (最
高人民法院关于人民法院在互联网公布裁判文书的规定) [Measures on the Publication of Judgments 
Online] (promulgated by the Sup. People’s Ct., Nov. 21, 2010, effective Nov. 21, 2010), §1, para. 2, 
http://www.court.gov.cn/xwzx/rdzt/sfgkxcyhdzt/zdwj/201203/t20120326_175408.html.  In addition, the 
rules provide that pending judgments and cases that have been mediated and withdrawn should not be 
publicized.  See Guanyu Sifa Gongkai De Liu Xiang Guiding (关于司法公开的六项规定) [Six Rules on 
the Disclosure of Judgments] (promulgated by the Sup. People’s Ct., Dec. 8, 2009, effective Dec. 8, 2009), 
§ 2, para. 2. 
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Provincial High Court issued detailed implementation guidance for the rules 
of disclosure, according to which all judgments effective as of October 1, 
2008, should be published online except those that fell clearly in the exempt 
categories.124  To encourage compliance, the High Court linked local judges’ 
compliance with the implementation of the rules to their performance 
evaluation. 125   Because administrative lawsuits against tax agents are 
unlikely to fall into the exempt categories, a large fraction of them should be 
published and available online.  Though the author’s research finds that a 
few cases are missing from the database, relevant information is available in 
published cases, which limits the potential bias.126  
The second reason the author selected Henan for the study is the 
amount of official malfeasance in the province.  Earlier research indicates 
that local governments in Henan suffer from a severe fiscal shortage, leading 
to heavy tax burdens and highly predatory local officials.127  This gives rise 
to massive grievances against the state and a steady supply of administrative 
lawsuits.  In particular, it gives rise to enough tax-related cases for a 
meaningful empirical study. 
Third, Henan led other Chinese provinces in promoting administrative 
litigation.  The Provincial High Court was one of the first to establish a high-
quality administrative law division.128  With support from the court president 
and the provincial party leaders, the division actively promoted lawsuits 
against local officials and reported one of the highest administrative 
litigation rates in China (calculated as number of filings per resident).129  
                                                      
124 Cáipàn Wénshū Shàngwǎng Gōngbù Guǎnlǐ Bànfǎ (裁判文书上网公布管理办法 ) 
[Administrative Rules Regarding Online Disclosure of Court Decisions and Judgments] (promulgated by 
the Henan Supreme Court, Oct. 9, 2009, effective Oct. 14, 2009), http://thxfy.chinacourt.org/public/ 
detail.php?id=170. 
125 Id. 
126 The High Court published one lawsuit that it should not have because the plaintiff withdrew the 
case.  See Yuangao Zhumadian Shi Tian Yi Jiudian Guanli Youxian Gongsi Yu Beigao Henan Sheng 
Zhumadian Shi Dìfang Shuiwu Ju Jicha Ju Shuishou Chafeng Baoquan Cuoshi Weifa Sunhaile Qi Hefa 
Quanyi Yi An (原告驻马店市天驿酒店管理有限公司与被告河南省驻马店市地方税务局稽查局税收
查封保全措施违法损害了其合法权益一案) [Zhumadian Tianze Hotel Management Ltd. v. Henan 
Zhumadian Ltd. Inspection Bureau], (Henan Zhumadian Yicheng Dist. Ct. 2009) (on file with author).  
Additionally, one administrative case should have been published because the plaintiff received a verdict.  
See Yuangao Renleliang Su Beigao Luoyang Shi Xi Gongqu Guojia Shuiwu Ju Shuiwu Xingzheng Jiangli 
Yi An (原告任乐亮诉被告洛阳市西工区国家税务局税务行政奖励一案) [Ren Leliang v. Luoyang STB], 
http://xgqfy.chinacourt.org/public/paperview.php?id=433625 (last visited Sept. 27, 2013).  Note the three 
decisions for the retrial of the Zhumadian cases were not published. 
127 See Hongbin Cai, et al., supra note 84 at 62.  
128  Ji Li, Suing the State: A Study of Administrative Litigation at the Provincial Level in China 108 
(2012) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Northwestern University) (on file with author). 
129 Id. at 110-11. 
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Moreover, Henan was for a long time the most populous province in 
China130  and, located close to the geographic center of the country, the 
province is representative of China in many aspects.  For the above reasons, 
theories derived from a study of tax-related administrative lawsuits in Henan 
should be widely applicable in many other Chinese provinces.   
In addition to the lawsuits against tax agents reported by the courts in 
Henan, the author conducted archival research into published materials 
relating to the cases, the parties involved, and the underlying disputes.  This 
included other lawsuits (civil and criminal) in which the plaintiffs 
participated.  This research enabled the author to understand the contexts for 
the tax-related administrative disputes and derive a few general attributes 
that explain the puzzling existence of tried lawsuits against tax agencies in 
China. 
Before proceeding to the detailed case analysis, some summary 
statistics of the cases are in order.  From 2009 to 2011, only forty-one 
decisions and judgments involved tax agencies as defendants.131  Because 
the sample contains decisions and judgments by both trial and appellate 
courts, some of which relate to the same underlying disputes, there are a 
total of only nineteen separate complainants.  In addition, some courts 
reported multiple judgments or decisions for different claims or issues of the 
same case.  Also, because several of the complainants are related parties, 
e.g., companies implicated in the same tax evasion investigation, the actual 
number of underlying disputes is even smaller. 
Appellate courts rendered sixteen of the forty-one published decisions 
and judgments.  Plaintiffs appealed more than half of the cases filed after 
2009.132  The extra efforts by the plaintiffs, however, did not translate into 
substantial benefits.  Only three cases appealed by taxpayers were sent back 
for retrial, all of which satisfied the appellate court after a few cosmetic 
changes by the trial court.133  Among the nineteen plaintiffs, seven initiated 
lawsuits in 2009, three in 2010, and nine in 2011.  Eight of the plaintiffs are 
individuals, the rest are all privately-owned corporate entities.  Among the 
defendant tax agencies, ten are STB bureaus, eight are LTB bureaus, and one 
                                                      
130  See CHINESE BUREAU OF STATISTICS, REPORTS BASED ON THE YEAR 2000 CONSENSUS, TABLE 1-1 
http://www.stats.gov.cn/tjsj/ndsj/renkoupucha/2000pucha/pucha.htm (last visited Sept. 27, 2013). 
131  Cases on file with the author. 
132 Several of the trial court rulings omitted from publication are included in this total. 
133 One additional case was sent back to the trial court for a retrial after the procuratorate lodged a 
protest.  See Yuanshen Yuangao Liuyongjian, Yang Feng Su Guangshan Xian Caizheng Ju Shuiwu 
Zhengshou Xingzheng Jiufen Yi An (刘永建、杨锋诉光山县财政局税务征收行政纠纷一案) [Liu & 
Yang v. Guangshan County Finance Department], (Henan Guangshan Cnty. Ct. 2010), 
http://www.110.com/panli/panli_4014611.html (last visited Sept. 28, 2013). 
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is a local finance department.  Of the plaintiffs, 52.6% hired legal counsel, 
compared to 84.2% of the defendants. 134   Finally, none of the plaintiffs 
prevailed at the initial trial.  
As discussed in the previous part, judicial bias and agency retaliation 
prevent escalation from disputes to administrative lawsuits.  Tax agencies, 
however, do not enjoy unlimited power.  Their jurisdiction is territorial and 
other powerful agencies check their power in the political system.  Those 
that are able to avoid the heavy costs of agency retaliation may sue if 
substantial interests are at stake and no alternative resolutions are available.  
In addition, as in the resolution of all disputes, high transaction costs and 
plaintiffs’ optimism may further contribute to the trial of administrative 
lawsuits against tax agencies in China.  As will be shown, all of the cases in 
the analyzed sample contain one or more of these factors, in ways not 
necessarily mutually exclusive. 
 
A. Lack of Taxable Resources and Professional Whistleblowers 
 
Because tax agencies’ authority is limited to taxable income and 
assets, those with low income are largely immune to any post-litigation 
retaliation by the agencies.  In Ren v. Zhengzhou STB Inspection Bureau, the 
plaintiff, a tax whistleblower, reported suspected tax evasion by a furniture 
store to the local STB.135  According to the factual findings of the case, the 
defendant investigated the reported violation, but failed to inform the 
plaintiff of the results.136  The plaintiff alleged the STB inspection bureau 
violated the law by not fully disclosing the investigation and the penalties 
subsequently imposed.137  The plaintiff in this case had a low-paying job, 
which exempted him from paying income taxes other than those withheld by 
his employer. 138   Without much to lose, he was therefore immune to 
retaliations by local tax agencies, which significantly reduced his actual 
litigation costs. 
Nonetheless, low costs are costs.  What are the plaintiffs’ positive 
incentives for challenging powerful state agents in court?  In the Ren case, 
                                                      
134 In two of these cases, it is not entirely clear whether the parties were represented by legal counsel. 
135 Renleliang Su Zhengzhou Shi Guojia Shuiwu ju Jicha Ju Buluxing Fading Zhize Yi An Yishen 
Xingzheng Panjueshu (任乐亮诉郑州市国家税务局稽查局不履行法定职责一案一审行政判决书) [Ren 
v. Zhengzhou STB Investigation Bureau] (Zhengzhou 27 Distr. Ct., Mar. 20, 2012),  
http://www.31credit.com/caselaw/1056106.html. 
136  Id. 
137  Id. 
138 Yunlong Zhao, “Yiyuan Jiangli” Jubaoren Ai Weiquan [“One Yuan Award” Informant Enjoys 
Rights-Protection], JINAN TIMES (Oct. 17, 2011), http://news.sohu.com/20111017/n322393854.shtml.  
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the plaintiff reported possible tax evasion of a local furniture store in order 
to receive a material reward.139   Under current law, the state rewards a 
portion of the levies and fines subsequently assessed (capped at 5% of the 
deficiency) to tax whistleblowers who contribute to the tax evasion detection 
and prosecution.140  In the Ren case, the plaintiff insisted on the disclosure 
about the penalty specifically so he could challenge the amount of his 
reward. 141   Article 20 of the Administrative Rules re Reporting Tax 
Violations, issued by the national office of the STB, provides that tax report 
centers should notify the informant of the investigation result, but only if he 
so requests.142  In this case, the court ruled that the plaintiff did not make a 
clear request for investigation result, so the defendant was not obliged to 
inform him.143  
In Ren v. Luoyang Xigong District STB, the same tax whistleblower 
directly challenged the amount the court rewarded him, which was in the 
amount of RMB 1, the equivalent of approximately USD 0.17. 144  The fact 
patterns of the two cases are similar:  in each case, a merchant refused to 
issue invoices evidencing a purchase and the plaintiff reported the possible 
tax evasion to the local tax center.145  In Ren v. Luogong, the plaintiff alleged 
that the tax inspection bureau failed to take necessary actions to investigate 
                                                      
139  Renleliang Su Zhengzhou Shi Guojia Shuiwu ju Jicha Ju Buluxing Fading Zhize Yi An Yishen 
Xingzheng Panjueshu (任乐亮诉郑州市国家税务局稽查局不履行法定职责一案一审行政判决书) [Ren 
v. Zhengzhou STB Investigation Bureau] (Zhengzhou 27 Distr. Ct., Mar. 20, 2012), 
http://www.31credit.com/caselaw/1056106.html. 
140 税务违法案件举报奖励办法 [Rules on Awards for Reporting Tax Law Violations] (July 27, 
2005), http://www.chinatax.gov.cn/n8136506/n8192153/n8192242/n8192667/n8194601/8248300.html.  
141 See Renleliang Su Zhengzhou Shi Guojia Shuiwu ju Jicha Ju Buluxing Fading Zhize Yi An 
Yishen Xingzheng Panjueshu (任乐亮诉郑州市国家税务局稽查局不履行法定职责一案一审行政判决
书 ) [Ren v. Zhengzhou STB Investigation Bureau] (Zhengzhou 27 Distr. Ct., Mar. 20, 2012), 
http://www.31credit.com/caselaw/1056106.html. 
142 Shuiwu Weifa Anjian Jubao Jiangli Banfa (税务违法案件举报奖励办法) [Rules on Awards for 
Reporting Tax Law Violations] (promulgated by the State Administration on Taxation, effective July 27, 
2005), http://www.chinatax.gov.cn/n8136506/n8192153/n8192242/n8192667/n8194601/8248300.html. 
143 See Renleliang Su Zhengzhou Shi Guojia Shuiwu ju Jicha Ju Buluxing Fading Zhize Yi An 
Yishen Xingzheng Panjueshu (任乐亮诉郑州市国家税务局稽查局不履行法定职责一案一审行政判决
书 ) [Ren v. Zhengzhou STB Investigation Bureau] (Zhengzhou 27 Distr. Ct., Mar. 20, 2012), 
http://www.31credit.com/caselaw/1056106.html. 
144 Yuangao Renleliang Su Beigao Luoyang Shi Xi Gongqu Guojia Shuiwu Ju Shuiwu Xingzheng 
Jiangli Yi An (原告任乐亮诉被告洛阳市西工区国家税务局税务行政奖励一案) [Ren v. Luoyang 
Xigong District STB] (Oct. 26, 2010), (on file with author).  Video footage is available at 
http://tv.hncourt.org/video/detail/court/0/id/10315 (last visited Sept. 30, 2013). 
145 Yuangao Renleliang Su Beigao Luoyang Shi Xi Gongqu Guojia Shuiwu Ju Shuiwu Xingzheng 
Jiangli Yi An (原告任乐亮诉被告洛阳市西工区国家税务局税务行政奖励一案) [Ren v. Luoyang 
Xigong District STB] (Oct. 26, 2010), (on file with author). 
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the case.146  After repeated requests by the plaintiff, the bureau eventually 
found the reported merchant in violation of tax law and imposed a fine.147  It 
then mailed a notice to the plaintiff of the reward of RMB 1 ( USD 0.17) for 
reporting the violation.148  The tax whistleblower then filed a lawsuit to 
challenge the amount of the reward.149  At trial, the lawyer for the tax bureau 
argued that if the law had been strictly followed, the reward would have 
been even lower (RMB 0.5, or USD 0.085).150  In other words, the tax 
whistleblower had been excessively rewarded.  The court ruled for the tax 
bureau, though it commented that the reward appeared unreasonably low.151  
The meager award in this specific case was not the only incentive for 
the lawsuit, nor was the tax whistleblower solely after the legal right to be 
informed by tax agencies.  To fully understand the plaintiff’s motives, one 
has to look at the case in light of its social and legal context.  The plaintiff 
was a member of an emerging group of professional whistleblowers who 
live on the material rewards received for being informants to government 
agencies or on compensations from caught violators.152  Over the past two 
decades, the state has established a plethora of laws and regulations to 
sanction illegal practices such as selling fake products or tax evasion and 
provide material rewards to those who assist in enforcement of the law.153  
Such a modern-day bounty system can be found in the tax administration of 
most countries, including the United States.  Because some of the rewards 
                                                      
146 Zhiqiang Huang, Jubao Shangjia Taoshui Jinhuo Yiyuan Jiangli (黄志强, 举报商家逃税仅获一
元奖励, 东方早报 ) [Reporting of Tax Violation Awarded One Yuan Only], DONGFANG DAILY (Sept. 24, 
2011), http://www.dfdaily.com/html/33/2011/9/24/670404.shtml. 
147 Id. 
148  Id. 
149  Id. 
150  Id. 
151 Yuangao Renleliang Su Beigao Luoyang Shi Xi Gongqu Guojia Shuiwu Ju Shuiwu Xingzheng 
Jiangli Yi An (原告任乐亮诉被告洛阳市西工区国家税务局税务行政奖励一案) [Ren v. Luoyang 
Xigong District STB] (Oct. 26, 2010) (on file with author).  Video footage is available at: http://tv. 
hncourt.org/video/detail/court/0/id/10315 (last visited Sept. 30, 2013). 
152 Zhengfang Tang, Zhongguo Sanqian Zhiye Dajiaren: Qingjia Dangchan Chihaichong (中国 3000
职业打假人：倾家荡产“吃害虫”) [Three Thousand Professional Whistleblowers in China], NANGUO 
DAILY (Jan. 22, 2008), http://www.cctv.com/community315/special/C20532/20080122/104785.shtml. 
153 See, e.g., Zhōnghuá rénmín gònghéguó shípǐn ānquán fǎ (中华人民共和国食品安全法) [Food 
Safety Law] (promulgated by order of the President of the People’s Republic of China, Feb. 28, 2009, 
effective June 1, 2009), §96, http://www.procedurallaw.cn/english/law/200903/t20090320_196425.html; 
Zhōnghuá rénmín gònghéguó xiāofèi zhě quányì bǎohù fǎ (中华人民共和国消费者权益保护法) [Law for 
the Protection of Consumer Rights] (promulgated by the National People’s Congress, Oct. 31, 1993, 
effective Jan. 1, 1994), §49, http://www.wipo.int/wipolex/en/details.jsp?id=8745; Measures on Rewarding 
the Reporting of Tax Evasion (July 2005) at § 5 (on file with author). 
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are substantial 154  and non-compliance is rampant in China, some 
whistleblowers have engaged full-time in seeking out illegal practices and 
claiming compensation from the violators or rewards from relevant 
government agencies.155  
This explains why the plaintiff in Ren v. Luogong sued for RMB 1 and 
refused to settle.  Because caught violators fear negative publicity, it is easier 
for them to compensate a well-known litigious whistleblower directly.  
Whistleblowers are therefore incentivized to litigate cases that could receive 
intensive media coverage because this enhances their publicity and helps 
maintain a credible litigation threat to violators. 156  The media, though still 
subject to state control, often find stories about suing government officials 
interest-provoking.157   After litigating the Luogong case, Mr. Ren quit his 
previous job and became devoted full-time to uncovering and reporting 
counterfeits and illegal commercial activities, earning enough to support his 
family.158 
Among the nineteen plaintiffs who went to trial against tax agencies in 
Henan Province from 2009 to 2011, three were whistleblowers159 who share 
a few common characteristics—namely that they were largely immune to 
potential agency retaliations due to their low and simple-sourced income.  
The extra-judicial costs of suing local officials were therefore lower for them 
than most other victims of abusive tax agents.  In addition, some of the 
                                                      
154 For instance, 2006 Nian Shuishou Jianmian He Weisheng Baojian Fa (2006 年税收减免和卫生保
健法)[Tax Relief and Health Care Act of 2006] § 406 caps the reward at 30% of the recovered taxes. 
155 See Zhengfang Tang, supra note 152. 
156 Xingzou zai Bianfengzhong de Zhiye Dajiaren (行走在边缝中的职业打假人群) [Professional 
Whistleblowers Walk on the Edge], 379 PHOENIX WKLY. (2010). 
157 Daniela Stockmann & Mary E. Gallagher, Remote Control: How the Media Sustain Authoritarian 
Rule in China, 44 COMP. POL. STUD. 436 (2011). 
158 Shuxiang Chang & Jiwei Wan, Bubihui Bieren Shuowo Kao Suopei Shenghuo, Jinbao 
Mianduimian zhi Dajian Renshi Ren Leliang (不避讳别人说我靠索赔生活 今报面对面之打假人士任乐
亮, 东方今报 ) [Not Afraid of Living on Whistleblowing, Jinbao Faces Whistleblower Ren Leliang], 
DONGFANG DAILY (Mar. 13, 2012), http://www.jinbw.com.cn/jinbw/xwzx/zzsx/201203137593.htm. 
159 Renleliang Su Zhengzhou Shi Guojia Shuiwu ju Jicha Ju Buluxing Fading Zhize Yi An Yishen 
Xingzheng Panjueshu (任乐亮诉郑州市国家税务局稽查局不履行法定职责一案一审行政判决书) [Ren 
v. Zhengzhou STB Investigation Bureau] (Zhengzhou 27 Distr. Ct., Mar. 20, 2012), 
http://www.31credit.com/caselaw/1056106.html; Yuangao Wangpenghui Su Beigao Zhengzhou Shi Erqi 
qu Guojia Shuiwu Ju Jicha Ju Shuiwu Xingzheng Chuli Yi An Yishen Xingzheng Wenshu (原告王朋辉诉
被告郑州市二七区国家税务局稽查局税务行政处理一案一审行政文书) [Wang v. Zhengzhou 27 
District STB Investigation Bureau],  (Henan Zhengzhou 27 District Court, Mar. 9, 2011) (on file with 
author); Jiaguoqiang Su Henan Sheng Guojia Shuiwu Ju Bufu Fuyi Jueding Yi An Yishen Xingzheng 
Panjueshu (贾国强诉河南省国家税务局不服复议决定一案一审行政判决书) [Jia v. Henan Provincial 
STB] (Henan Zhengzhou Jinshui District Court, Aug. 15, 2011), http://www.31credit.com 
/caselaw/651791.html. 
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whistleblowers litigated pro se or with the assistance of fellow 
whistleblowers, 160  which further lowered the formal costs of litigation.  
Moreover, they were savvy users of public media, which protected them and 
eased negotiations for compensation.161  However, while media coverage 
gives the whistleblowers additional incentives to sue, it also increases the 
stakes for the defendant agencies to prevail in the lawsuits.  Furthermore, the 
agencies do not fully incorporate the costs of litigation as individual 
disputants.  Therefore, in all three of the above mentioned cases initiated by 
the informants, the agencies engaged outside legal counsel, even in the case 
where the claim was for RMB 1.162  
Though low-income earners are retaliation-proof, they are rarely seen 
in courts against tax agencies.  This, however, should not be a surprise.  If an 
individual barely survives above the subsistence level, little income is left 
for taxation.  Therefore, the lack of interaction between low-income earners 
and tax collectors curtails the probability of conflicts between the two 
parties.  Lawsuits do not exist without conflicts in the first place. 
 
B. Limited Interaction with Tax Agencies 
 
Agency retaliation can be very costly if the complainant expects to 
interact with the agency for a long period of time.  Therefore, the rational 
response to official malfeasance is often to take no action.  However, if the 
complainant expects no further dealings with the agency, his or her exposure 
to retaliation is limited and litigation becomes an attractive option, especially 
if substantial interests are at stake. 
The lawsuits by Wu Jishan and Li Wenfeng against the local STB of 
Xin County best illustrate this point.163  Before filing the administrative 
lawsuit, the plaintiffs had spent years pursuing other paths towards a 
remedy.164  After being laid off during the economic reform of the late 
1990s, the plaintiffs invested all their savings and a significant amount of 
                                                      
160 See Jiaguoqiang Su Henan Sheng Guojia Shuiwu Ju Bufu Fuyi Jueding Yi An Yishen Xingzheng 
Panjueshu (贾国强诉河南省国家税务局不服复议决定一案一审行政判决书) [Jia v. Henan Provincial 
STB] (Henan Zhengzhou Jinshui District Court, Aug. 15, 2011), http://www.31 
credit.com/caselaw/651791.html. 
161 See Xingzou zai Bianfengzhong de Zhiye Dajiaren, supra note 156. 
162 See Zhiqiang Huang, supra note 146. 
163 Wujishan, Liwenfeng Yu Xin Xian Gongye He Xinxi Hua Ju, Xin Xian Gongshang Ju, Xin Xian 
Guojia Shuiwu Ju, Xin Xian Zhiliang Jishu Jiandu Ju Xingzheng Peichang Jiufen Yi An (吴继山、李文凤
与新县工业和信息化局、新县工商局、新县国家税务局、新县质量技术监督局行政赔偿纠纷一案) 
[Wu Jishan & Li Wenfeng v. Xin County STB and Others for Administrative Compensation], (Henan Xin 
County Court, Feb. 28, 2011) (on file with author). 
164 Id. 
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borrowed money into a mobile gas station.165  In 1999, they obtained all 
necessary licenses, permits, and tax registrations for the operation of the 
small business.166  Yet, within a year of the approvals, a joint team of local 
government officials confiscated all of the plaintiff’s permits and business 
licenses and forcefully shut down the gas station without any 
compensation.167   
During this process, the officials used force and failed to follow legal 
procedures.168  Having lost all of their investments, the plaintiffs began to 
petition through an alternative channel called “letter and visit” for redress, 
arguing that the confiscation and shutdown of their business was illegal.169  
Their efforts proved fruitless and Wu suffered a stroke in 2003.170  When his 
health improved in 2008, they resumed their petition efforts.171  The local 
officials negotiated with the plaintiffs and persuaded them to use the court to 
resolve the dispute.172  The plaintiffs agreed that if the court accepted the 
case, they would cease petitioning through the letter and visit system.173  
With nothing to lose and their future livelihood at stake, the couple filed an 
application for an administrative reconsideration petition and then filed the 
lawsuit.174   
The legal system, however, was not designed to accommodate such 
cases.  The court ruled against the plaintiffs on the basis that the statute of 
limitations had run.175  The whole adjudicatory process appears to have been 
another tactic of the local state to delay the case and add more costs to the 
plaintiffs’ pursuit for justice.  In addition, by enticing the plaintiffs in a legal 
battle they would certainly lose, the local state could label the plaintiffs’ act 
“illegal.”  Embedded in local politics, trial courts generally cannot resist the 
pressure to cooperate and share the responsibilities of the politicians’ illegal 
acts.176  
As discussed earlier, a tax agency’s control is limited to its own 
jurisdiction.  Therefore, if a taxpayer’s only contact with a tax jurisdiction is 
the holding of certain taxable assets, the interaction between the taxpayer 
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166 Id.  
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176 See, e.g., Qinghua Wang, supra note 9. 
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and the tax agency ends when the ownership terminates, as was the case in 
Chen v. Xingyang LBT.177  The taxpayer in that case sold all of his shares in a 
cemetery business to another individual.178  The tax bureau of the district 
where the cemetery was located calculated his gains from the sale and levied 
heavy income taxes.179  The plaintiff then filed a lawsuit challenging the 
calculation.180  With all of the shares in the cemetery business sold and the 
only contact with the tax agency’s jurisdiction terminated, the plaintiff freed 
himself from future agency retaliation and significantly reduced the extra-
judicial costs of litigating the dispute.   
Unlike professional whistleblowers who may litigate cases for a trivial 
amount of money, but high publicity, most taxpayers sue because large sums 
of money are at stake.  In the Chen case, the retaliation-proof plaintiff 
challenged the assessed tax because it would have imposed a substantial 
financial burden on him 181  and he had nothing to lose through agency 
retaliation.   
 
C. Substantial Interests at Stake and a Lack of Alternative Channels for 
Dispute Resolution 
 
Trial may also occur if the relationship between the complainant and 
the defendant tax agency has turned irremediably hostile.  Hostility shuts 
down all less confrontational channels for resolving a conflict and litigation 
will add little extra cost to the complainant in such a situation.  Also, if 
substantial interests are at stake, such as large sums of money, long-
established reputations, or the survival of businesses, the lawsuit will likely 
go to trial, as illustrated in the following case.   
In Zhengzhou Boyu Ltd. v. Zhengzhou Zhongyuan District STB and 
Zhengzhou Boyu Ltd. v. Zhengzhou Zhongyuan District STB for 
Administrative Compensation, the plaintiff was a new subsidiary of a 
national company in sales.182  The subsidiary in Zhengzhou had encountered 
                                                      
177 Chen Zhan Shengsu Henan Sheng Xingyang Shi Difang Shuiwu Ju Shuiwu Xingzheng Chufa Yi 
An Yishen Xingzheng Panjueshu (陈战胜诉河南省荥阳市地方税务局税务行政处罚一案一审行政判决





182 Zhengzhou Bo Yu Youse Jinshu Luliao Youxian Gongsi Yu Zhengzhou Shi Zhongyuan Qu 
Guojia Shuiwu Ju Yi An (郑州博宇有色金属炉料有限公司与郑州市中原区国家税务局一案 ) 
[Zhengzhou Boyu Ltd. v. Zhengzhou Zhongyuan District STB], (Henan Zhengzhou Intermediate Court, 
July 1, 2009) (on file with author);  Zhengzhou Bo Yu Youse Jinshu Luliao Youxian Gongsi Yu 
Zhengzhou Shi Zhongyuan Qu guojia Shuiwu Ju Xingzheng Peichang Yi An (郑州博宇有色金属炉料有
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numerous tax administrative problems since its establishment. 183   The 
plaintiff suspected that the STB local agent erected administrative barriers in 
order to assist the company’s local competitor.184  For instance, the defendant 
refused to register the plaintiff as a “general VAT taxpayer” or to properly 
issue VAT invoices to the plaintiff.185  
Because of the wide discretion enjoyed by the tax agent, these 
administrative barriers were not per se illegal.  The dispute that triggered the 
lawsuit was the tax agent’s refusal to register the plaintiff as a regular 
general VAT taxpayer.186   Under China’s VAT system, newly-established 
companies often undergo a trial period.187  For up to six months, the taxpayer 
conducts its business under the guidance of relevant tax agents.188  The trial 
period ends when the agents consider the taxpayer capable of fulfilling its 
VAT-related tax obligations (such as properly distributing VAT invoices).189  
During the trial period, deduction for VAT is subject to delay because of the 
heightened scrutiny by the tax agency.190  In this case, the local tax agent 
denied the plaintiff’s application for registration as a regular general VAT 
taxpayer, citing its inability to obtain and issue VAT invoices properly.191  
The plaintiff company responded by publishing harsh criticisms of the tax 
agents on its company website.192  The hostility between the two parties 
                                                                                                                                                              
限公司与郑州市中原区国家税务局行政赔偿一案) [Zhengzhou Boyu Ltd. v. Zhengzhou Zhongyuan 
District STB for Administrative Compensation],  (Henan Zhengzhou Intermediate Court, July 1, 2009 (on 
file with author). 
183 Dui Zhongyuanqi Xushuizhen Guoshuiju De Zaici Tousushu (对中原区须水镇国税局的再次投





186 Zhengzhou Bo Yu Youse Jinshu Luliao Youxian Gongsi Yu Zhengzhou Shi Zhongyuan Qu 
Guojia Shuiwu Ju Yi An (郑州博宇有色金属炉料有限公司与郑州市中原区国家税务局一案 ) 
[Zhengzhou Boyu Ltd. v. Zhengzhou Zhongyuan District STB], (Henan Zhengzhou Intermediate Court, 
July 1, 2009) (on file with author). 
187 Guójiā shuìwù zǒngjú guānyú jiāqiáng xīn bàn shāngmào qǐyè zēngzhí shuì zhēngshōu guǎnlǐ 
yǒuguān wèntí de jǐnjí tōngzhī (国家税务总局关于加强新办商贸企业增值税征收管理有关问题的紧急
通知 )[STB Notice on Issues Regarding VAT Collection and Administration for Newly-Established 
Businesses] (repealed in 2010 by Administrative Rules On Vat General Taxpayer During Trial Period), 
http://www.jincao.com/fa/17/law17.s132.htm (last visited Oct. 14, 2013). 
188 Id. at § 3. 
189 Id. 
190 Id. at § 4. 
191  Zhengzhou Bo Yu Youse Jinshu Luliao Youxian Gongsi Yu Zhengzhou Shi Zhongyuan Qu 
Guojia Shuiwu Ju Yi An (郑州博宇有色金属炉料有限公司与郑州市中原区国家税务局一案 ) 
[Zhengzhou Boyu Ltd. v. Zhengzhou Zhongyuan District STB], (Henan Zhengzhou Intermediate Court, 
July 1, 2009) (on file with author). 
192  Dui Zhongyuanqi Xushuizhen Guoshuiju De Zaici Tousushu, supra note 183. 
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almost certainly ruled out the option of non-judicial resolution of their 
dispute.   
Because the plaintiff filed a lawsuit against the local agent, the court 
rejected its application for administrative reconsideration immediately.193  
During trial and appeal, the plaintiff produced evidence, such as audio 
recordings of a key witness, to show that it had complied with the relevant 
regulations and that the defendant had abused its discretion.194  The counsel 
for the defendant argued that the identity of the recorded person could not be 
verified so the audio evidence could not contradict the written testimony of 
the witness used by the defendant as evidence of VAT non-compliance.195  
Both the trial court and the appellate court, instead of exercising their 
judicial authority and verifying the identity of the key person, readily 
accepted the defendant counsel’s technical argument and ruled for the tax 
agent.196   
The plaintiff likely consulted its parent company’s corporate counsel 
before filing the lawsuits.197  Given the amount of evidence gathered from 
dealings with the defendant agency, the counsel was likely optimistic about 
winning the case and perhaps inspired the plaintiff’s persistence in the trial 
and subsequent appeal.  However, apparently fair evidentiary rules applied 
by a selectively passive court produced surprising results. 
Similarly, in Hua County Hongri Auto Ltd. v. Hua County LTB 
Chengguanzhongxin Tax Office and the derivative lawsuit for administrative 
compensation, the relationship between the plaintiff and the defendant tax 
agency was broken prior to the filing of the lawsuits.198  The plaintiff in these 
lawsuits registered with the local tax office in early 2007199 but paid no taxes 
                                                      
193 Zhengzhou Bo Yu Youse Jinshu Luliao Youxian Gongsi Yu Zhengzhou Shi Zhongyuan Qu 
Guojia Shuiwu Ju Yi An (郑州博宇有色金属炉料有限公司与郑州市中原区国家税务局一案 ) 
[Zhengzhou Boyu Ltd. v. Zhengzhou Zhongyuan District STB], (Henan Zhengzhou Intermediate Court, 
July 1, 2009) (on file with author). 
194  Id. 
195  Id. 
196  Id. 
197  Dui Zhongyuanqi Xushuizhen Guoshuiju De Zaici Tousushu, supra note 183. 
198 See Huá xiàn hóng rì chē yè yǒuxiàn gōngsī su huá xiàn dìfāng shuìwù jú chéngguān zhōngxīn 
shuìwù suǒ shuìwù xíngzhèng zhēngshōu yī àn èrshěn xíngzhèng pànjuéshū (滑县红日车业有限公司诉滑
县地方税务局城关中心税务所税务行政征收一案二审行政判决书) [Hua County Hongri Auto Ltd. v. 
Hua County Ltb Chengguanzhongxin Tax Office Re Administrative Taking],  (Anyang Intermediate Court) 
(on file with author); Shàngsù rén huá xiàn hóng rì chē yè yǒuxiàn gōngsī yīn yāoqiú huá xiàn dìfāng 
shuìwù jú chéngguān zhōngxīn shuìwù suǒ xíngzhèng péicháng yī àn èrshěn xíngzhèng pànjuéshū (上诉人
滑县红日车业有限公司因要求滑县地方税务局城关中心税务所行政赔偿一案二审行政判决书) [Hua 
County Hongri Auto Ltd. v. Hua County Ltb Chengguanzhongxin Tax Office Re Administrative 
Compensation] (on file with author). 
199 See Huá xiàn hóng rì chē yè yǒuxiàn gōngsī su huá xiàn dìfāng shuìwù jú chéngguān zhōngxīn 
shuìwù suǒ shuìwù xíngzhèng zhēngshōu yī àn èrshěn xíngzhèng pànjuéshū (滑县红日车业有限公司诉滑
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until May 2008 when the tax office issued a deficiency letter.200  After the 
plaintiff failed to respond,201 its legal representative was arrested under the 
charge of criminal tax evasion.  He pled guilty and was sentenced to six 
months in jail with one year suspension and a fine of RMB 20,000 
(approximately USD 3,000).202  The plaintiff was also ordered to pay back 
taxes and tax penalty in the amount of more than RMB 20,000 .203  The 
criminal prosecution most likely closed the door for negotiation and 
settlement.  Moreover, having suffered the criminal punishment, the plaintiff 
likely feared no further retaliation by local tax officials.  With much at stake, 
the plaintiff filed administrative lawsuits against the tax agency.204  After the 
trial court unsurprisingly dismissed the claims,205 the plaintiff appealed.206  
Upon appeal, the plaintiff’s lawyer pointed out several major errors 
committed by the trial court, which included:  1) the court’s disregard for the 
company’s status as a newly established company (meaning the enterprise 
income tax should not have been imposed),207 2) the lack of a legal basis for 
levying real estate tax and land use tax (the evidence was collected during 
the criminal prosecution and after the administrative penalties had been 
levied),208 and 3) the agency’s failure to follow relevant legal procedures in 
providing most of the legal documents to the plaintiff, directly causing her 
failure to timely appeal the penalties and advance relevant legal claims.209  
The plaintiff asked the appellate court to reverse the trial court’s ruling and 
to order compensation for her losses due to the defendant’s illegal actions.210   
The appellate court agreed with the trial court, even though the tax 
agency failed to provide sufficient evidence of its compliance with legal 
procedures.211  The court emphasized that the criminal charges, unchallenged 
by the plaintiff, clearly established the validity of the tax penalties.212  
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Another case sharing similar features is Xin'an Huafeng Corp. v. 
Henan Xin'an STB for Administrative Compensation, where the plaintiff 
sued local STB agents after its application for administrative compensation 
was rejected. 213   The application claimed that the tax agents forged 
documents causing the applicant and his company to be criminally 
prosecuted for tax evasion.214   The plaintiff used to have close business 
relationships with the local government and had previously extended trade 
credits to two companies owned by the government.215  By 1999, the two 
county-owned companies owed the plaintiff back payments totaling more 
than RMB 1.3 million.216  When the debtors refused to pay back the loans, 
the plaintiff took them to court.217  While the civil case was being litigated 
and the court put a lien on the debtors’ assets, the plaintiff was arrested by 
Xin’an County police and prosecuted for tax evasion and fraud.218  The 
county court found him guilty of both crimes and sentenced him to prison 
for six years, plus a fine of RMB 200,000.219  
On appeal, the intermediate court sent the case back for retrial by the 
county court, which again found the plaintiff guilty of tax evasion, but 
dismissed the fraud charge.220  The plaintiff was sentenced to three years in 
prison, with a three-year reprieve.221  By the time the plaintiff was released 
on bail, he had spent seventeen months in jail.222  The plaintiff then appealed 
the county court decision to the intermediate court, which affirmed the 
decision.223  The tax evasion case was publicized that year as one of eight 
major cases in Henan Province. 224   The salience of the case and the 
                                                      
213 Xin'an Huafeng Corp. V. Henan Xin'an STB for Administrative Compensation (新安华峰中油销
售公司诉河南省新安县国家税务局行政赔偿纠纷一案一审行政裁定书),  (Henan Laocheng District 
Court) (on file with author). 
214 See Xīn'ān huá fēng zhōngyóu xiāoshòu gōngsī su hénán shěng xīn'ān xiàn guójiā shuìwù jú 
xíngzhèng péicháng jiūfēn yī àn yīshěn xíngzhèng cáidìng shū (新安华峰中油销售公司诉河南省新安县
国家税务局行政赔偿纠纷一案一审行政裁定书) [Xin'an Huafeng Corp. v. Henan Xin'an STB for 
Administrative Compensation], (Henan Laocheng District Court) (on file with author). 
215 See Henan Laoban Xiang Zhengfu Qiye Cuikuang Hou Bei Panxing, Baniang Hou Huo Qingbai 
[Henan Businessman Sentenced after Demanding Debt Payment from SOE, Acquital After Eight Years], 
DAOHE BAO (Oct. 13, 2010), http://news.xinhuanet.com/legal/2010-10/13/c_12653610.htm. 
216  Id. 
217  Id. 
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223  Id. 
224 STATE ADMINISTRATION OF TAXATION, DAIHE BAO,TOUTAO KENGPIAN GUOJIA SHUISHOU 
1357.82 WANYUAN, BAQIYE HEIBANG YOUMING (偷逃坑骗国家税收 1357.82万元 8企业“黑榜”有名],”
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endorsement by different levels of the local government made it difficult to 
reverse the judgment.  
As noted earlier, the Chinese judicial system allows for the reopening 
or retrial of a case that has been decided by an appellate court.  The lack of 
finality to the judicial process partially explains why some litigants persist 
on going to trial even though they fully expect to lose.  With a possibility of 
favorable results at higher levels, taxpayers may litigate if the stakes 
involved are high enough.  In the case described above, the plaintiff 
followed this path and petitioned the appellate court for a review of its own 
decision.225  When the petition was rejected, he brought the complaint all the 
way to the provincial high court.226  The high court accepted it in 2005, but 
waited until 2010 to render a ruling favorable to the plaintiff.227   
The dramatic prosecution and subsequent quest for justice exhausted 
the plaintiff’s wealth, insulating him for future costs of agency retaliation.  
Also, the prosecution by the county government inevitably resulted in deep 
hostility between the parties, closing all other channels for resolving their 
conflicts.  Moreover, lengthy legal battles usually educate plaintiffs about 
how to navigate the judicial system, making them more inclined to sue.228  
With substantial interests at stake, the plaintiff filed lawsuits against a 
number of powerful local government agencies soon after the provincial 
high court reversed the lower decision.229  
Litigation may also be the only option if the taxpayer is implicated in 
major corruption cases, as illustrated by Zhumadian Yatai Shiye Ltd. v. 
Zhumadian LTB Inspection Bureau and related cases. 230   All of the tax 
                                                                                                                                                              
大河报) [TAX EVASION OF 13.5782 MILLION YUAN, EIGHT COMPANIES ON BLACKLIST] (May 17, 2004), 
http://www.chinatax.gov.cn/n8136506/n8136608/n9948163/10023706.html. 
224 Henan Laoban Xiang Zhengfu Qiye Cuikuang Hou Bei Panxing, Baniang Hou Huo Qingbai, 
[Henan Businessman Sentenced after Demanding Debt Payment from SOE, Acquital After Eight Years], 
DAOHE BAO (Oct. 13, 2010), http://news.xinhuanet.com/legal/2010-10/13/c_12653610.htm. 
225 Henan Laoban Xiang Zhengfu Qiye Cuikuang Hou Bei Panxing, Baniang Hou Huo Qingbai, 
[Henan Businessman Sentenced after Demanding Debt Payment from SOE, Acquital After Eight Years], 
Daohe Bao (Oct. 13, 2010), http://news.xinhuanet.com/legal/2010-10/13/c_12653610.htm. 
226 Id. 
227 Id. 
228 See Mary E. Gallagher, Mobilizing the Law in China: “Informed Disenchantment” and the 
Development of Legal Consciousness, 40 LAW & SOC'Y REV. 783, 802-05 (2006). 
229 See, e.g., Yuángào lúshūmín, lúzhànfēng, zhānghuìlíng, mèng dōngjiāng yīn yǔ bèigào xīn'ān xiàn 
chǎnyè jíjù qū guǎnlǐ wěiyuánhuì xíngzhèng péicháng yī àn de xíngzhèng yīshěn cáidìng, (2011) luò xíng 
chū zì dì 6 hào (原告卢书民、卢占峰、张会玲、孟东江因与被告新安县产业集聚区管理委员会行政
赔偿一案的行政一审裁定, （2011）洛行初字第 6 号) [Lu et al v. Xin’an County Industrial District 
Administration Committee re Administrative Compensation] (2011) (on file with author). 
230 See Yuángào zhùmǎdiàn shì jīnfǎ jīngjì màoyì yǒuxiàn gōngsī bèigào hénán shěng zhùmǎdiàn shì 
dìfāng shuìwù jú jīchá jú xíngzhèng chǔfá yī àn (原告驻马店市金发经济贸易有限公司被告河南省驻马
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disputes behind these administrative lawsuits can be traced back to a series 
of bribery prosecutions, and the companies suspected of playing a 
facilitating role were investigated by several government agencies, including 
the LTB inspection bureau. 231  After the investigation, the tax agency levied 
heavy fines.232  For instance, the LTB fined Yatai Shiye Ltd. about RMB 85 
million and Jinfa Ltd. about RMB 20 million.233  Several companies’ assets 
were insufficient to pay the penalties, so the inspection bureau went after 
their shareholders in an attempt to pierce the corporate veil.234  
The penalties were too heavy for the investigated companies to fully 
comply with, especially after huge sums had been transferred to a third 
party.235  Because other channels for dispute resolution had been closed, the 
companies seemingly had no choice but to file administrative lawsuits 
challenging the penalties.  Moreover, because they had lost all of their 
assets, the plaintiffs were immune to further retaliation.  The initial set of 
trial court decisions contain simple dismissals of the complaints, with the 
                                                                                                                                                              
店市地方税务局稽查局行政处罚一案) [Zhumadian Jinfa Jingji Maoyi Ltd. v. Henan Zhumadian LTB 
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独立地位和股东有限责任赔偿纠纷一案）[Zhou Nongchang and Others v. Zhumadian LTB], (Henan 
High Court) (on file with author). 
235 See Hénán shěng zhùmǎdiàn shì dìfāng shuìwù jú jīchá jú shēnqǐng zhíxíng bèi zhíxíng rén 
zhùmǎdiàn shì yà tài shíyè yǒuxiàn gōngsī, bèi zhíxíng rén zhùmǎdiàn shì jīnfǎ màoyì fāzhǎn yǒuxiàn 
gōngsī zhíxíng yìyì cáidìng shū (河南省驻马店市地方税务局稽查局申请执行被执行人驻马店市亚泰实
业有限公司、被执行人驻马店市金发贸易发展有限公司执行异议裁定书) [Henan Zhumadian LTB 
Inspection Bureau Motion for Execution Re Zhumadian Yatai Shiye Ltd. & Zhumadian Jinfa Maoyi 
Fazhan Ltd.],  (Henan Zhumadian Intermediate Court) (on file with author). 
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court briefly noting that the statute of limitations had run and the plaintiffs 
failed to show cause.236   
The plaintiffs appealed the trial court decisions, which were reversed 
by the appellate court and sent back for retrial.237  The trial court again ruled 
in favor of the tax agency but this time on technical grounds.238  The legal 
representatives of the plaintiff companies were fugitives wanted by the local 
police.239  Unable to appear in court, they engaged a lawyer from Beijing, 
who was granted the power of attorney to litigate the cases against the local 
LTB.240  During the retrial, the defendant argued that the lawyer could not 
prove that the seal and signatures on the engagement letters were authentic, 
taking advantage of the fact that the clients could not appear in court to 
testify.241  The lawyer made the reasonable rebuttal that the defendant should 
bear the burden to prove that the prima facie valid seal and signatures were 
forged.242  The court, however, sided with the tax agency and dismissed the 
cases. 243   The appellate court, apparently reluctant to step into a battle 
between the fugitives and the powerful local tax agency, upheld the trial 
court decisions this time.244  
Xinxiang Yungongmao Ltd. v. Weihui City LTB245 is further proof that 
litigation is the only available channel for dispute resolution when business 
relations with the government fail.  In this case, the plaintiff challenged an 
enormous deficiency assessed by the city LTB.246  The plaintiff’s company 
                                                      
236 Yuángào zhùmǎdiàn shì gāoxīn qū jīnmíng shāngmào yǒuxiàn gōngsī bèigào hénán shěng 
zhùmǎdiàn shì dìfāng shuìwù jú jīchá jú xíngzhèng chǔfá yī àn (原告驻马店市高新区金明商贸有限公司
被告河南省驻马店市地方税务局稽查局行政处罚一案) [Zhumadian Gaoxin District Jinming Shangmao 
Ltd. v. Henan Zhumadian LTB Inpsection Bureau], (Henan Zhumadian City Yicheng District Court) (on 
file with author). 
237 See Zhumadian Yatai Shiye Ltd. for Administrative Punishment (驻马店市亚泰实业有限公司税
务行政处罚一案二审行政裁定书 ), (Henan Zhumadian Intermediate Court) (on file with author); 
Zhumadian Gaoxin District Jinming Shangmao Ltd. for Administrative Punishment (驻马店市高新区金明
商贸有限公司税务行政处罚一案二审行政裁定书), (Henan Zhumadian Intermediate Court) (on file with 
author); Zhumadian Jinfa Jingji Maoyi Ltd. for Administrative Punishment (驻马店市金发经济贸易有限
公司税务行政处罚一案二审行政裁定书),  (Henan Zhumadian Intermediate Court) (on file with author). 
238  Id. 
239  Id. 
240  Id. 
241  Id. 
242  Id. 
243  Id. 
244 Id. 
245  Xinxiang Yungongmao Ltd. v. Weihui City LTB Re (2009) 005 and (2010) 005 Punishment (新乡
市运工贸有限公司不服被告卫辉市地方税务局卫地税罚（2009）005 号《税务行政处罚决定书》和
卫地税罚（2010）005 号《税务行政处罚决定书》一审行政判决书), (Henan Weihui City Court) (on 
file with author). 
246  Id. 
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had at one point enjoyed close business ties with the local government.247  
The two parties agreed to set up a joint venture, but the local government 
failed to invest the prior stipulated amount of capital.248  Instead of letting 
the joint venture dissolve, the local government granted the company tax 
deductions as replacement for the capital investment.249  It also ordered other 
government agencies to allow the joint venture to pass annual examination 
and registration, despite insufficient equity. 250   At a certain point, the 
cooperative state-business relationship must have broken down because in 
2004, the tax bureau issued the plaintiff a penalty for tax deficiency, which 
the plaintiff paid in full.251  In 2009, the LTB again audited the company’s 
accounts from 1995 to 2009, issued a deficiency notice with penalty, and 
broadcasted it on local television.252  The accumulated hostility, the publicity 
of the tax controversy, and the substantial stakes for both parties made 
litigation the preferred option to resolve this dispute.  
Following an administrative reconsideration decision in favor of the 
tax agency, the plaintiff filed the lawsuit and raised numerous legal issues, 
both procedural and substantive.253  The plaintiff claimed that the “Notice of 
Tax Deficiency and Penalty” was issued twice and delivered ineffectively to 
one of the plaintiff’s lawyers, who lacked the requisite special power of 
attorney.254  The plaintiff also presented evidence that its tax registration had 
been revoked so that the defendant was partially responsible for the 
plaintiff’s noncompliance and that some of the taxes were erroneously 
assessed.255   
The court regarded these procedural and evidentiary issues as minor 
flaws that were not critical to the court’s decision.256  Upon appeal, the 
plaintiff made a similar technical argument about the illegality of the 
                                                      
247  Id. 
248  Id. 
249  Id. 
250 Id. 
251 Id. 
252 See Zhōnghuá Rénmín Gònghéguó Shuìshōu Zhēngshōu Guǎnlǐ Fǎ (中华人民共和国税收
征收管理法 ) [Tax Collection Management Law] (promulgated by the Ninth National People’s 
Congress, April 28, 2001, effective May 1, 2001), ch. 1, art. 1-2, http://www.gov.cn/banshi/2005-
08/31/content_146791.htm. 
253  Xinxiang Shi Yun Gong Mao Youxian Gongsi Bufu Beigao Wei Hui Shi Difang Shuiwu Ju Wei 
Dishui Fa (2009) 005 Bao “Shuiwu Xingzheng Chufa Juedìng Shu” He Wei Dishui Fa (2010) 005 Hao 
“Shuiwu Xingzheng Chufa Jueding Shu” Yishen Xingzheng Panjueshu, (新乡市运工贸有限公司不服被
告卫辉市地方税务局卫地税罚（2009）005 号《税务行政处罚决定书》和卫地税罚（2010）005 号
《税务行政处罚决定书》一审行政判决书) [Xinxiang Yungongmao Ltd. v. Weihui City LTB Re (2009) 
005 and (2010) 005 Punishment], (Henan Weihui City Ct.) (on file with author).  
254  Id. 
255  Id. 
256  Id. 
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“Notice of Tax Deficiency and Penalty,” but the appellate court affirmed 
without engaging in any detailed legal discussion of these technicalities.257 
Zhoukou Huilin Zhiye Ltd. v. Zhoukou City LTB is another case where 
a damaged business-government relationship resulted in administrative 
litigation. 258   The plaintiff, a real estate developer, held close personal 
relationships with former leaders of Zhoukou City.259  The plaintiff worked 
on an infrastructure project in Zhoukou to which the municipal government 
promised capital investment.260  However, instead of capital investment, the 
government decided to grant the plaintiff substantial tax benefits to cover the 
cost of the project due to a fiscal shortage.261  Yet before the project was 
completed, the developer’s political allies left local politics due to job 
changes and criminal prosecutions for corruption.262  After the project was 
completed, the plaintiff negotiated with the local LTB about the promised 
tax benefits, but the negotiation went slowly. 263   The loss of political 
protection likely explains the delay by the LTB in approving the tax benefits 
promised by the former local leaders.  The plaintiff then engaged in self-help 
and reported zero revenue gain to the LTB for year 2008.264   The LTB 
responded immediately by assessing a tax deficiency and imposing heavy 
                                                      
257  Xinxiang Shi Yun Gong Mao Youxian Gongsi Su Wei Hui Shi Difang Shuiwu Ju Shuiwu 
Chuli Jueding Yi An Ershen Xingzheng Panjueshu, (新乡市运工贸有限公司诉卫辉市地方税务局
税务处理决定一案二审行政判决书) [Xinxiang Yungongmao Ltd. v. Weihui City Ltb], (Xinxiang 
City Interm. Ct.) (on file with author).  
258 Zhoukou Hui Lin Zhiye Youxian Gongsi Bufu Zhoukou Shi Difang Shuiwu Ju Er Jiu Nian 
Si Yue Sanshi Ri Zuochu De Zhou Dishui Fu Bu Shou Zì (2009) Di 1 Bao Shuiwu Xingzheng Fuyi 
Bu Yu Shouli Jueding Shu Yi An, (周口汇林置业有限公司不服周口市地方税务局二○○九年四月
三十日作出的周地税复不受字（2009）第 1 号税务行政复议不予受理决定书一案) [Zhoukou 
Huilin Zhiye Ltd. v. Zhoukou City LTB],  (Zhoukou City Chuanhui Dist. Ct.) (on file with author). 
259 Hong  Xin, 河南一开发商 “非典型逃税 ”领 4 亿元天价罚单 [A Henan Developer's 
"Extraordinary Tax Evasion" Penalty of 400 Million Yuan], 法制日报 [LEGAL DAILY] (Feb. 11 2010), 
http://unn.people.com.cn/GB/14775/21684/10972241.html. 
260 Id. 
261 The method may also reflect the government’s intention to bypass the public bidding procedure 
required for usual public projects. 
262 Zhanghaiqin Fan Shouhuì Zui, Jue Caichan Laiyuan Buming Zui Yi An, (张海钦犯受贿罪、巨额
财产来源不明罪一案) [Zhang Haiqin for Corruption], (Henan High Ct.) (on file with author)  (plaintiff’s 
legal representative was also suspected for bribery). See generally, 河南省十届人大代表范学林涉嫌行贿 
将逮捕 [Tenth National People’s Congress of Henan Province will arrest Fanxue Lin for alleged Bribery], 
HENAN PEOPLE (Sep. 28, 2007, 7:53 AM), http://henan.people.com.cn/news/2007/09/28/223934.html.  
263 Hong Xin, 河南一开发商 “非典型逃税 ”领 4 亿元天价罚单 [A Henan Developer's 
"Extraordinary Tax Evasion" Penalty of 400 Million Yuan], 法制日报 [LEGAL DAILY] (Feb. 11, 2010), 
http://unn.people.com.cn/GB/14775/21684/10972241.html. 
264 Id. 
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penalties that exceeded RMB 400 million (USD 63 million).265  The owner 
of the company was arrested and charged with criminal tax evasion.266 
The plaintiff then filed a petition for administrative reconsideration.267  
The petition was rejected on the alleged basis that the plaintiff failed to pay 
the deficiency, which under current law is a precondition for administrative 
reconsideration of tax-related issues. 268   The plaintiff then sued the 
reconsideration body for the LTB.269  The plaintiff produced the minutes of 
the municipal government meeting, which noted in writing that the costs 
incurred in the project should be covered by tax deductions.270  The plaintiff 
argued that its investment should therefore be equivalent to the assessed 
deficiency and sufficient to satisfy the payment requirement for 
administrative reconsideration.271  The court found that the minutes did not 
constitute a valid legal basis for tax deduction. 272   Given the political 
complexity of the case and the amount at stake, the court must have been 
reluctant to involve itself in the dispute and readily upheld the decision of 
the administrative reconsideration body, leaving the plaintiff without legal 
recourse. 
Given the high stakes and lack of alternative resolution channels due 
to the change in local leadership, the plaintiff sued the LTB and several other 
powerful local government agencies. 273   As noted earlier, though the 
                                                      
265 Id. 
266 Id.  
267  Zhoukou Hui Lin Zhiye Youxian Gongsi Bufu Zhoukou Shi Difang Shuiwu Ju Er Jiu Nian 
Si Yue Sanshi Ri Zuochu De Zhou Dishui Fu Bu Shou Zì (2009) Di 1 Bao Shuiwu Xingzheng Fuyi 
Bu Yu Shouli Jueding Shu Yi An, (周口汇林置业有限公司不服周口市地方税务局二○○九年四月
三十日作出的周地税复不受字（2009）第 1 号税务行政复议不予受理决定书一案) [Zhoukou 
Huilin Zhiye Ltd. v. Zhoukou City LTB],  (Zhoukou City Chuanhui Dist. Ct.) (on file with author). 
268 Shuìwù xíngzhèng fùyì guīzé (税务行政复议规则 ) [Tax Rules for Administrative 
Reconsideration] (promulgated by the State Administration of Tax Bureau, Dec. 15, 2009, effective 
April 1, 2010), http://www.chinatax.gov.cn/n8136506/n8136593/n8137537/n8138502/9563669.html. 
269  Zhoukou Hui Lin Zhiye Youxian Gongsi Bufu Zhoukou Shi Difang Shuiwu Ju Er Jiu Nian Si Yue 
Sanshi Ri Zuochu De Zhou Dishui Fu Bu Shou Zì (2009) Di 1 Bao Shuiwu Xingzheng Fuyi Bu Yu Shouli 
Jueding Shu Yi An, (周口汇林置业有限公司不服周口市地方税务局二○○九年四月三十日作出的周地
税复不受字（2009）第 1 号税务行政复议不予受理决定书一案) [Zhoukou Huilin Zhiye Ltd. v. 
Zhoukou City LTB],  (Zhoukou City Chuanhui Dist. Ct.) (on file with author). 
270  Id. 
271 Id.  
272  Id. 
273 Zhoukou Hui Lin Zhiye Youxian Gongsi Yu Zhoukou Shi Guotu Ziyuan Ju Zuochu De Zhou Tu 
Fa Jue Zi (2009) 5 Hao Xingzheng Chufa Jueding Yi An, (周口汇林置业有限公司与周口市国土资源局
作出的周土罚决字（2009）5号行政处罚决定一案) [Zhoukou Huilin Zhiye Ltd. v. Zhoukou Bureau of 
State Land Administration], (Zhoukou City Chuanhui Dist. Ct.) (on file with author); Zhoukou Hui Lin 
Zhiye Youxian Gongsi Yu Zhoukou Shi Renmin Zhengfu Zhouzhengtu (2009) 132 Hao Xingzheng 
Jueding Yi An, (周口汇林置业有限公司与周口市人民政府周政土（2009）132 号行政决定一案) 
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probability of prevailing in the trial court was minimal, the plaintiff might 
have held some hope for the intervention from the appellate and provincial 
high courts.274  The plaintiff’s case, however, rests on a very narrow legal 
basis.  The promise of tax benefits recorded in the meeting minutes 
contradicts the Law on Tax Administration,275 limiting the chance of reversal 
by a higher court.   
The wealthy developer in this case had accumulated significant 
political capital before the onset of the confrontations with the LTB and 
other government agencies.276  The close ties between the developer and the 
previous local leaders, which contributed to his early business success, 
turned against him when he lost political support and had to rely on the 
judiciary for protection.  Had there been more transparency in his interaction 
with the local government and stronger legal basis for his claim, the result 
might have been different, as illustrated by the following case.  
In Liu & Yang v. Guangshan County Finance Department and its 
retrial, the plaintiffs were also in the real estate business.277  In July 2008, the 
plaintiffs won a public auction to develop commercial real estate on a lot in 
Guangshan County.278  In September 2009, the county department of finance 
levied a tax of RMB 355,110 (USD 56,000) over the two plaintiffs for 
occupation and use of arable land.279  The plaintiffs contended that the tax 
was levied erroneously because they purchased the land-use right from the 
county government, which had already converted the land from agricultural 
use to commercial and construction use.  Plaintiffs also claimed that the 
Provisional Rules re Taxes for Occupation and Use of Agricultural Land and 
its implementation rules jointly issued by the State Council and the STB 
stipulated that the county government, as the party responsible for the 
                                                                                                                                                              
[Zhoukou Huilin Zhiye Ltd. v. Zhoukou Municipal Government],  (Zhoukou City Chuanhui Dist. Ct.) (on 
file with author). 
274 See Hong Xin, supra note 263.  The provincial high court accepted the plaintiff’s petition for 
review, but has not responded.  
275 See Zhōnghuá rénmín gònghéguó shuìshōu zhēngshōu guǎnlǐ fǎ (中华人民共和国税收征收管理
法) [Tax Collection Management Law] (promulgated by the Ninth National People’s Congress, April 28, 
2001, effective May 1, 2001), http://www.gov.cn/banshi/2005-08/31/content_146791.htm. 
276 Hénán shěng shí jiè réndà dàibiǎo fànxuélín shèxián xínghuì jiāng dàibǔ (河南省十届人大代表
范学林涉嫌行贿 将逮捕) [Henan Provincial People’s Congress Deputy to be Arrested for Bribery], 
HENAN PEOPLE (Sept. 28, 2007), http://henan.people.com.cn/news/2007/09/28/223934.html. 
277 Yuanshen Yuangao Liuyongjian, Yang Feng Su Yuanshen Beigao Guangshan Xian Caizheng Ju 
Shuiwu Zhengshou Xingzheng Jiufen Yi An, (原审原告刘永建、杨锋诉原审被告光山县财政局税务征
收行政纠纷一案) [Liu & Yang v. Guangshan County Finance Department-Retrial], (Henan Guangshan 
County Ct. 2010) (on file with author). 
278  Id. 
279  The tax is still collected by the finance department in some localities.   
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conversion, should pay the tax.280  Citing the STB Notice Regarding Certain 
Issues in the Collection of Land Occupation Tax, a normative document, the 
defendant county finance department argued that the party in actual use of 
the arable land should be liable for the tax.281  The trial court ignored the 
conflict between the applicable law and the STB normative document (the 
judge actually determined that the two were consistent) and ruled against the 
plaintiffs.282  
Instead of appealing the trial court decision, however, the plaintiffs 
applied for the procuratorate to lodge a protest, contending that the trial 
court relied on dubious evidence and applied the law erroneously.283  The 
appellate court agreed with the procuratorate and sent the case back to the 
county court for retrial.284  A different panel of trial judges acknowledged its 
mistake and ruled in favor of the plaintiffs.285  
This case contrasts with Zhoukou Huilin Zhiye Ltd. v. Zhoukou City 
LTB.286  In Liu & Yang, the plaintiffs won a bid at a public auction to 
develop a lot whereas in Zhoukou Huilin the plaintiff was designated by a 
local leader to invest in the infrastructural project.287  The local governments 
levied heavy taxes on plaintiffs in both cases,288 but the plaintiffs in Liu & 
                                                      
280  See Yuanshen Yuangao Liuyongjian, Yang Feng Su Yuanshen Beigao Guangshan Xian Caizheng 
Ju Shuiwu Zhengshou Xingzheng Jiufen Yi An, (原审原告刘永建、杨锋诉原审被告光山县财政局税务
征收行政纠纷一案) [Liu & Yang v. Guangshan County Finance Department-Retrial], (Henan Guangshan 
County Ct. 2010) (on file with author). 
281  Id. 
282  Id. 
283  Yuanshen Yuangao Liuyongjian, Yang Feng Su Yuanshen Beigao Guangshan Xian Caizheng Ju 
Shuiwu Zhengshou Xingzheng Jiufen Yi An, (原审原告刘永建、杨锋诉原审被告光山县财政局税务征
收行政纠纷一案) [Liu & Yang v. Guangshan County Finance Department-Retrial], (Henan Guangshan 
County Ct. 2010) (on file with author). 
284  Id. 
285 Id. 
286  Zhoukou Hui Lin Zhiye Youxian Gongsi Bufu Zhoukou Shi Difang Shuiwu Ju Er Jiu Nian Si Yue 
Sanshi Ri Zuochu De Zhou Dishui Fu Bu Shou Zì (2009) Di 1 Bao Shuiwu Xingzheng Fuyi Bu Yu Shouli 
Jueding Shu Yi An, (周口汇林置业有限公司不服周口市地方税务局二○○九年四月三十日作出的周地
税复不受字（2009）第 1 号税务行政复议不予受理决定书一案) [Zhoukou Huilin Zhiye Ltd. v. 
Zhoukou City LTB],  (Zhoukou City Chuanhui Dist. Ct.) (on file with author). 
287 See Hong Xin, supra note 263.  
288  Zhoukou Hui Lin Zhiye Youxian Gongsi Bufu Zhoukou Shi Difang Shuiwu Ju Er Jiu Nian Si Yue 
Sanshi Ri Zuochu De Zhou Dishui Fu Bu Shou Zì (2009) Di 1 Bao Shuiwu Xingzheng Fuyi Bu Yu Shouli 
Jueding Shu Yi An, (周口汇林置业有限公司不服周口市地方税务局二○○九年四月三十日作出的周地
税复不受字（2009）第 1 号税务行政复议不予受理决定书一案) [Zhoukou Huilin Zhiye Ltd. v. 
Zhoukou City LTB],  (Zhoukou City Chuanhui Dist. Ct.) (on file with author); Yuanshen Yuangao 
Liuyongjian, Yang Feng Su Yuanshen Beigao Guangshan Xian Caizheng Ju Shuiwu Zhengshou Xingzheng 
Jiufen Yi An, (原审原告刘永建、杨锋诉原审被告光山县财政局税务征收行政纠纷一案) [Liu & Yang 
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Yang faced less serious charges than the plaintiffs in Zhoukou Huilin.289  
Though it is unrealistic to completely rule out corruption in the public 
auction, it would certainly take more for the local state to challenge the 
legality of the auction procedure than the private deal in Zhoukou Huilin.  
When disputes with the local governments involving substantial 
stakes arose, the plaintiffs in Liu & Yang were able to rely on formal law for 
remedy whereas the plaintiff in Zhoukou Huilin found formal law against its 
interests.290  Though in both cases the local courts ruled in favor of the 
defendant local government agencies, the plaintiffs in the former solicited 
the assistance of both the procuratorate and the appellate court. 291   In 
Zhoukou Huilin, however, the plaintiff’s prospect of success was more 
uncertain because higher courts, if reviewing the trial decision strictly in 
accordance with the law, would be unlikely to reverse the decision. 
 
D. Powerful Allies in the Political System 
 
As demonstrated by the reversal of trial court decision in Liu & Yang, 
the state is not monolithic.  Power tends to be more fragmented at the 
municipal and provincial level, where the government structure is complex 
and extensive, and agencies have narrow and specialized jurisdictions.  It is 
therefore possible for taxpayers to maintain good relationships with certain 
power holders and at the same time be antagonistic towards the tax agencies.  
Though Chinese courts exhibit systemic bias in favor of companies with 
political connections,292 that bias is less serious when both disputants are 
                                                                                                                                                              
v. Guangshan County Finance Department-Retrial], (Henan Guangshan County Ct. 2010) (on file with 
author). 
289  Yuanshen Yuangao Liuyongjian, Yang Feng Su Yuanshen Beigao Guangshan Xian Caizheng Ju 
Shuiwu Zhengshou Xingzheng Jiufen Yi An, (原审原告刘永建、杨锋诉原审被告光山县财政局税务征
收行政纠纷一案) [Liu & Yang v. Guangshan County Finance Department-Retrial], (Henan Guangshan 
County Ct. 2010) (on file with author). 
290 Zhoukou Hui Lin Zhiye Youxian Gongsi Bufu Zhoukou Shi Difang Shuiwu Ju Er Jiu Nian Si Yue 
Sanshi Ri Zuochu De Zhou Dishui Fu Bu Shou Zì (2009) Di 1 Bao Shuiwu Xingzheng Fuyi Bu Yu Shouli 
Jueding Shu Yi An, (周口汇林置业有限公司不服周口市地方税务局二○○九年四月三十日作出的周地
税复不受字（2009）第 1 号税务行政复议不予受理决定书一案) [Zhoukou Huilin Zhiye Ltd. v. 
Zhoukou City LTB],  (Zhoukou City Chuanhui Dist. Ct.) (on file with author).  
291 Yuanshen Yuangao Liuyongjian, Yang Feng Su Yuanshen Beigao Guangshan Xian 
Caizheng Ju Shuiwu Zhengshou Xingzheng Jiufen Yi An, (原审原告刘永建、杨锋诉原审被告光山
县财政局税务征收行政纠纷一案) [Liu & Yang v. Guangshan County Finance Department-Retrial], 
(Henan Guangshan County Ct. 2010) (on file with author). 
292 Michael Firth, et al., The Effects of Political Connections and State Ownership on Corporate 
Litigation in China, 54 J. OF LAW AND ECON. 573 (2011). 
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powerful or have powerful allies.293  Fearing to offend either party, judges 
will carefully address issues raised by both, as illustrated in both the Liu & 
Yang retrial and the following case, Shanghai Dazhong Auto Nanyang Sales 
and Service Ltd. v. Nanyang STB. 
 
1. Politically-Connected Individuals Use the Law to Protect and Extend 
Their Interests 
 
In Shanghai Dazhong Auto Nanyang Service Ltd. v. Jiang Sujian,294 
the plaintiff company had a history of contested ownership. Originally 
owned and managed by the regional military division, the company went 
through a management buyout in 2003 to implement a state policy.295  Jiang, 
the officer who had managed the company before the sale, purchased a 
majority of the offered shares with a loan of RMB 3.7 million from Wang.296  
The loan agreement stipulated that Jiang would transfer 80% of the 
purchased shares to Wang, but continue to serve as board director for three 
years after the buyout.297  
Disputes arose when Jiang refused to transfer the shares to Wang.  
Instead of suing Jiang for breach of contract, Wang presented the loan 
agreement to the local bureau of industry and commerce, which allowed him 
to change the corporate ownership structure and to appoint himself board 
director.298  Though his approval was legally required, Jiang did not know of 
these changes until he lost control of the company.299  In December 2004, 
Jiang filed an administrative lawsuit against the local bureau of industry and 
commerce, seeking revocation of the new business license and restoration of 
the previous one.300  The trial court ruled in favor of Jiang.301  Both the 
defendant and Wang appealed the decision to the provincial high court, 
which reversed the trial court decision.302  As noted earlier, an appellate 
                                                      
293 Ji Li, When Are There More Laws? When Do They Matter? Using Game Theory to Compare Laws, 
Power Distribution, and Legal Environments in the United States and China, 16 PAC. RIM L. & POL'Y J. 
335, 347 (2007). 
294 Shanghai Dazhong Qiche Nanyang Xiaoshou Fuwu Youxian Gongsi, Jiangshujian Yin 
Qinquan Jiufen Yi An Ershen Minshi Caiding Shu, (上海大众汽车南阳销售服务有限公司、姜书建
因侵权纠纷一案二审民事裁定书) [Shanghai Dazhong Auto Nanyang Service Ltd. v. Jiang Sujian], 
(Nanyang Interm. Ct.) (on file with author).  
295  Id.  
296  Id. 
297  Id. 
298  Id. 
299  Id. 
300  Id. 
301  Id. 
302  Id. 
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decision, though final in theory, may be further challenged through a petition 
for a retrial.303  Jiang filed such a petition, and the high court reviewed and 
reversed its own earlier judgment.304 
Armed with the favorable high court judgment, Jiang went to the local 
Bureau of Industry and Commerce to negotiate the restoration of the original 
business license for Nanyang Auto. 305   Wang, informed of Jiang’s 
whereabouts, sent a group of people to harass him.306  Jiang was beaten in 
the government building, for which Wang was arrested and jailed for seven 
days. 307   Unsatisfied with the “harsh” punishment, Wang filed an 
administrative lawsuit against the local police. 308   The trial court found 
sufficient evidence to uphold the police’s administrative action.309  Wang 
then appealed and the appellate court affirmed.310   
 
2. Fearing Both Parties, the Court in Nanyang Auto Conducted a 
Careful, Balanced Analysis  
 
Having participated in numerous civil and administrative lawsuits at 
all levels of the provincial judiciary, Wang understood how the Chinese legal 
system operated in practice. 311   He also had allies in the local state, 
evidenced by the assistance he received from the Bureau of Industry and 
Commerce and the nominal punishment he received for organizing an 
assault on Jiang in a government building. 312  Well-connected individuals 
                                                      
303 See Zhōnghuá rénmín gònghéguó xíngzhèng sùsòng fǎ (中华人民共和国行政诉讼法 ) 
[Administrative Procedure Law] (promulgated by the Seventh National people’s Congress, April 4, 1989, 
effective Oct. 1, 1990), art. 62. 
304 Qian Wu & Ning Wang, Nanyang Admininistrative Suit Settled after Five Years, Nanyang Bic 
Lost (南阳民告官案 5年之后尘埃落定 南阳工商局败诉), HENAN LEGAL REP. (河南法制报) (Dec. 25, 
2009) , http://news.shangdu.com/101/2009/12/25/2009-12-25_300054_101.shtml. 
305 Shanghai Dazhong Auto Nanyang Service Ltd. v. Jiang Sujian (上海大众汽车南阳销售服务有限
公司、姜书建因侵权纠纷一案二审民事裁定书),  (Nanyang Intermediate Court) (on file with author). 
306  Wang Guihua v. Nanyang Public Security Bureau Wancheng Branch (王贵华诉南阳市公安局宛




309  Id. 
310 Wang Gui Huawei Zhian Xingzheng Chufa I An Ershen Xingzheng Panjueshu (王贵华为治安行
政处罚一案二审行政判决书),  [Wang Guihua Security Administrative Punishment for the Case of Second 
Instance Administrative Judgments], (Henan Nanyang Intermediate Ct. 2010) (on file with author). 
311  See Gallagher, supra note 228, for a general empirical discussion of the effect of personal 
experience of litigation on the inclination to sue. 
312  See Shanghai Dazhong Qiche Nanyang Xiaoshou Fuwu Youxian Gongsi, Jiangshujian Yin 
Qinquan Jiufen Yi An Ershen Minshi Caiding Shu (上海大众汽车南阳销售服务有限公司、姜书建因侵
102 PACIFIC RIM LAW & POLICY JOURNAL VOL. 23 NO. 1 
 
such as Wang are largely immune to extra-judicial agency retaliation; 
therefore, when the local STB sent Nanyang Auto a notice of deficiency, 
Wang reacted by applying for administrative reconsideration. 313   The 
reconsideration body nullified the local STB’s assessment of deficiency, 
citing insufficient consideration of all relevant evidence.314  After amending 
its calculation, the local STB sent Nanyang Auto another deficiency letter, 
which was then upheld by the reconsideration body.  Nanyang Auto, 
controlled by Wang,315 then filed an administrative lawsuit against the local 
STB.316  When the trial court rendered a decision that was not entirely in its 
favor, Nanyang Auto appealed.317  The appellate court sent the case back for 
retrial.318   
Upon retrial of this tax-related administrative case, the court 
conducted a thorough analysis of relevant facts and laws.319  Of the five 
major issues disputed between the two parties, the focus was on two issues:  
1) whether the local STB could determine tax deficiency based on 
transaction slips bearing the signatures of Nanyang Auto staff and 
2) whether the penalties levied were legal in procedure. 320   The court 
rendered a judgment that appeared to be only partially favorable to the 
plaintiff in that the court upheld three STB decisions. 321   However, the 
plaintiff was actually victorious because the court sided with Nanyang Auto 
on the two major issues.322  The court approved the trial court adjudicatory 
committee’s judgment, indicating an exercise of caution.323  
                                                                                                                                                              
权纠纷一案二审民事裁定书) [Shanghai Dazhong Auto Nanyang Service Ltd. v. Jiang Sujian], (Nanyang 
Intermediate Ct. 2011) (on file with author); Wangguihua Su Nanyang Shi Gongan Ju Wan Cheng Fenju 
Bufu Xingzheng Chufa Yi An Yishen Xingzheng Panjueshu (王贵华诉南阳市公安局宛城分局不服行政处
罚一案一审行政判决书 ) [Wang Guihua v. Nanyang Public Security Bureau Wancheng Branch],  
(Nanyang City Wancheng District Ct. 2010) (on file with author). 
313  Yuangao Shanghai Dazhong Qiche Nanyang Xiaoshou Fuwu Youxian Gongsi Bufu Beigao 
Nanyang Shi Guojia Shuiwu Ju Shuiwu Xingzheng Zhengshou Chufa Yi An De Yishen Xingzheng 
Panjueshu (原告上海大众汽车南阳销售服务有限公司不服被告南阳市国家税务局税务行政征收处罚
一案的一审行政判决书) [Plaintiff Shanghai Volkswagen Sales & Service Co., Ltd. Nanyang Nanyang 
City, State Revenue Against the Defendant Tax Administrative Penalties Levied a Case of First Instance 
Administrative Judgments], (Henan Provincial High Ct. 2009) (on file with author). 
314  Id. 
315  Id. 
316  Id. 
317  Id. 
318  Id. 
319 Id. 
320  Id. 
321  Id. 
322 Id. 
323 Id. 
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Unlike the defendant tax agency in Liu & Yang, the STB appealed the 
decision in Nanyang Auto.324  The practice of signing slips was common in 
the auto service industry and the slips were often the only written evidence 
of a transaction.325  If the trial court decision was upheld, the SATs would 
inevitably incur significant costs in proving underreported revenues by auto 
service providers.  The appellate court reversed the trial court decision over 
the validity of the evidence used by the STB.326  Nanyang Auto, however, 
was relieved from any penalty for underpaying taxes.327  The reason for 
nullifying the penalty was completely procedural.  The penalty was nullified 
because it was not delivered with a notice of the taxpayer’s right to a 
hearing.328   
This is in strong contrast to other judgments pertaining to issues about 
procedural legality.  In cases where plaintiffs pointed out defendant tax 
agencies’ procedural flaws in carrying out their duties, the court either 
bypassed the issues or treated them as innocuous. 329  Yet in a case where a 
politically-connected plaintiff had abundant litigation experiences, support 
from within the state, and resources to distribute, procedural issues were 
crucial. 
 
E. High Transaction Costs 
 
Settlement may also be unattainable if the substantial interests of a 
third party are involved in a dispute and its resolution is a zero-sum game 
between the taxpayer and the third party.  Such situations have a much 
higher transaction cost for negotiating a settlement.   
                                                      
324 Shangsu Ren Nanyang Shi Guojia Shuiwu Ju Yin Yishen Yuangao Shanghai Dazhong Qiche 
Nanyang Xiaoshou Fuwu Youxian Gongsi Su Yishen Beigao Nanyang Shi Guojia Shuiwu Ju Shuiwu 
Xingzheng Chuli Chufa Jiufen Yi An Ershen Xingzheng Panjueshu (上诉人南阳市国家税务局因一审原
告上海大众汽车南阳销售服务有限公司诉一审被告南阳市国家税务局税务行政处理、处罚纠纷一案
二审行政判决书) [Nanyang STB v. Shanghai Dazhong Auto Nanyang Sales and Service Ltd.], (Henan 
Nanyang Intermediate Ct. 2009) (on file with author). 
325 Id.  
326 Id. 
327  Id. 
328  Id. 
329 See, e.g., Zhengshou Bo Yu Youse Jinshu Luliao Youxian Gongsi Yu Zhengzhou Shi Zhongyuan 
Qu Guojia Shuiwu Ju Yi An (郑州博宇有色金属炉料有限公司与郑州市中原区国家税务局一案) 
[Zhengzhou Boyu Ltd. v. Zhengzhou Zhongyuan District STB], (2009) (on file with author); Xinxiang Shi 
Yun Gong Mao Youxian Gongsi Bufu Beigao wei Hui Shi Difang Shuiwu Ju Wei Dishui Fa (2009) 005 
hao “Shuiwu xingzheng chufa Jueding Shu” Yishen Xingzheng Panjueshu (新乡市运工贸有限公司不服
被告卫辉市地方税务局卫地税罚（2009）005 号《税务行政处罚决定书》和卫地税罚（2010）005
号《税务行政处罚决定书》一审行政判决书) [Xinxiang Yungongmao Ltd. v. Weihui City LTB Re 
(2009) 005 and (2010) 005 Punishment], (Henan Weihui City Ct. 2011) (on file with author). 
104 PACIFIC RIM LAW & POLICY JOURNAL VOL. 23 NO. 1 
 
In Wang v. Zhengzhou 27 District STB Investigation Bureau, a 
professional whistleblower reported tax evasion of an electronics store and 
disagreed with the subsequent taxes and penalties imposed by the defendant 
tax agency.330  The court granted the defendant tax agency’s motion to join 
the electronic store as a third party in the case.331  The store management had 
significant stakes in trying the case because the same commercial practice 
had been reported by other whistleblowers.332  The high transaction costs for 
settling a case involving third parties with high stakes in going to trial 
diminished the chance of a negotiated settlement. 
Another example of high transaction costs preventing settlement is 
Hengxin Real Estate Development Ltd. v. Jiyuan LBT, in which the plaintiff 
entered into a contract with two other parties (individual A and company A, 
where individual A is 99% shareholder of company A) to invest in a real 
estate development project. 333   In exchange for the plaintiff’s capital 
investment, individual A agreed to cede control of company A to the 
plaintiff. 334   Upon closing, the plaintiff received possession of all the 
company seals, licenses, and registrations.335  Not long after the deal, the 
partnership broke and the plaintiff ceased its investment.336  In order to 
regain control, Company A published an advertisement in a local newspaper 
claiming that it had lost the company’s seals and registration documents.337  
The publication was a necessary precondition for the company to obtain new 
registrations.338  Alerted by the advertisement, the plaintiff reported to the 
defendant LBT its possession of the registration and requested that the 
agency not issue new registration documents to company A.339  The agency 
allegedly agreed to investigate.340  However, when company A applied for 
                                                      
330 Yuangao Wangpenghui Su Beigao Zhengzhou Shi erqi Qu Guojia Shuiwu Ju Jicha Ju Shuiwu 
Xingzheng Chuli Yi An Yishen Xingzheng Wenshu (原告王朋辉诉被告郑州市二七区国家税务局稽查
局税务行政处理一案一审行政文书) [Wang v. Zhengzhou 27 District STB Investigation Bureau], (Henan 
Zhengzhou 27 District Ct. 2011) (on file with author). 
331  Id. 
332 Jiaguoqiang Su Henan Sheng Guojia Shuiwu Ju Bufu Fuyi Jueding Yi An Yishen Xingzheng 
Panjueshu (贾国强诉河南省国家税务局不服复议决定一案一审行政判决书) [Jia v. Henan Provincial 
STB], ( Henan Zhengzhou Jinshui District Ct. 2011) (on file with author). 
333 Yuangao XinXiang Shi Hengxin Fangdichan Kaifa Youxian Gongsi Su Beigao Jiyuan Shi Difang 
Shuiwu Ju Shuiwu Dengji Banfa Zhengzhao Yi An Yishen Xingzheng Panjueshu (原告新乡市恒信房地产
开发有限公司诉被告济源市地方税务局税务登记颁发证照一案一审行政判决书) [Xinxiang City 
Hengxin Real Estate Development Ltd. v. Jiyuan LTB], (Henan Jiyuan Ct. 2011) (on file with author). 
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new registration, the agency not only approved it but also allowed changes 
to the corporate registration that nullified the initial contract between the 
plaintiff and company A.341   
The plaintiff sued the LBT for approving the registration changes and 
asked the court to revoke the new registration.342  The court ruled against the 
plaintiff, noting that the contractual agreement between the plaintiff and the 
tax agency was not binding and that the agency did not violate any 
procedural or substantive law in approving the registration changes.343  The 
plaintiff in this case was located in a different city from the LTB and the 
failed investment was its one-time interaction with the defendant’s 
jurisdiction.344  Therefore, it was unlikely that the defendant LTB would 
retaliate against the plaintiff.  A trial was probably the only viable option 
given that the action concerned a third party (company A), substantial 
interests were at stake, and the zero-sum nature of the dispute.  Furthermore, 
real estate developers command substantial political and economic 
resources, enabling them to hire counsel and mount legal challenges to local 
government officials.  
In sum, the substantive survey of the tax-related administrative 
lawsuits in Henan Province from 2009 to 2011 illustrates the major reasons 
behind a complainant’s decision to go to trial.  The cases show a strong 
judicial bias favoring the tax agencies that, coupled with the high costs of 
agency retaliation, explains the acute reluctance to sue tax agencies in China.  
However, if a party can prevent or evade the retaliation, litigation may be a 
preferred option when substantial interests are at stake and other channels 
prove costly or unavailable.  Because of the limits to a tax agency’s power 
and discretion, such defense to retaliation may exist in situations where the 
complainant expects no future interaction with the agency, owns little 
taxable income or assets in the agency’s jurisdiction, or has powerful allies 
in the political system.  In addition, even when a party is not resistant to 
retaliation, a damaged relationship with tax agencies can lead to litigation if 
high stakes are involved.  In that case, the hostility has shut down non-
judicial channels to resolve conflicts, and litigation adds little extra costs for 
the complainant.  Moreover, general factors from conventional trial selection 
theories, such as high transaction costs and disputants’ optimism, apply as 
well.  The cases analyzed in this part substantiate these arguments and 
illustrate how the theoretical factors work in different factual settings. 
                                                      
341 Id. 
342  Id. 
343 Id. 
344 The Plaintiff is registered in Xinxiang City and the defendant’s jurisdiction is in Jiyuan City. 
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VII. CONTRIBUTIONS OF THE RESEARCH 
 
This part briefly discusses the contributions of this study to three 
literatures: tax administration in China, administrative litigation in China, 
and the selection of cases for trial. 
 
A. Tax Administration in China 
 
Professor Cui points out that the current tax administration in China 
operates on a feeble legal basis.  Taxpayers in general prefer interacting with 
tax agents to obtain information about tax law compliance and enforcement, 
and few go to court to resolve disputes.345  As noted earlier, a mere 405 
lawsuits were filed in 2011 against tax agencies in all of China.346  Even 
fewer cases were filed in 2009 and 2010—293 and 398 respectively.347  
Furthermore, plaintiffs withdrew most of the lawsuits.  This study offers a 
few explanations for the general reliance by Chinese taxpayers on informal 
institutions, such as personal interactions with tax agents, instead of courts, 
for tax compliance and dispute resolution in China, and the difficulties for 
the two paths to converge.  
For reasons listed below, current interactions between taxpayers, tax 
agents and the courts reflect an equilibrium that resists swift changes.  The 
equilibrium is conditioned on:  1) taxpayers failing to comply with tax laws 
and regulations, 2) tax agents enjoying great flexibility in administration and 
facing low risk of punishment for abusing their discretion, and 3) courts 
enforcing the law loosely and with strong bias in favor of the tax agents.  
Several structural factors determine the quasi-legal equilibrium for taxation 
in China. 
First, from a taxpayer’s perspective, full compliance with Chinese tax 
law is costly due to conflicting and ambiguous legal authorities (e.g., Liu & 
Yang and Nanyang Auto), gaps between business practice and what is 
required by the law (e.g., Nanyang Auto and Zhoukou Huilin), and high 
formal tax burdens.  As noted by a local tax agent, “most companies would 
go under if they had to pay all the taxes required by law.”348  Moreover, tax 
evasion is pervasive.349  
                                                      
345 See Wei Cui, supra note 37. 
346 See SUMMARY OF FIRST INSTANCE ADMINISTRATIVE LAWSUITS IN CHINA, supra note 4. 
347 See Haibo He, supra note 9. 
348 See Qian Wang & Xuena Li, supra note 65. 
349 Jinyan Li, Tax Transplants and Local Culture: A Comparative Study of the Chinese and Canadian 
GAAR, 11 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES IN LAW 655, 683 (2010).  
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From the angle of tax agents, on the other hand, wide discretion is 
necessary for tax administration because of their multiple concerns with 
local business development, meeting revenue targets, personal connections 
with the taxpayers, and rampant tax evasion.  Exercising this discretion often 
results in lax enforcement or violations of the law.350   
Meanwhile, when balancing noncompliance by taxpayers and 
violations of law by tax agents, weak Chinese courts easily side with the 
latter, finding their violations minor and innocuous or completely 
sidestepping the issues (e.g., Zhengzhou Boyu Ltd.).  In addition, the gap 
between business practices in China that de-emphasize formality on the one 
hand and the formal evidentiary, and procedural rules required for litigation 
on the other, curbs the role of the courts and provides reluctant judges with 
easy exits from adjudicating difficult administrative lawsuits (e.g., Zhoukou 
Huilin).   
As illustrated by the trivial number of tax-related administrative 
lawsuits filed each year, tax administration and dispute resolution are quite 
stable.  If a shift to a law-based equilibrium is considered a desirable policy 
goal, the state should coordinate changes to all the three parties and the 
institutional contexts in which they act, including:  1) a reduction of formal 
tax burdens and clarification of legal authorities that will reduce compliance 
costs for taxpayers, 2) preventing post-litigation retaliation by tax 
agencies, 351  and 3) encouraging judicial activism and independence in 
deciding administrative cases.   
Though the equilibrium is stable, this study nonetheless suggests that 
certain institutional conditions will nudge China towards a more law-
oriented society.  As illustrated by the contrast between the Liu & Yang case 
and the Zhoukou Huilin case,352 private Chinese companies can lower their 
risks by conducting business in compliance with basic laws and regulations, 
                                                      
350 Wang Xiang-kun, Wǒguó shuìwù zhífǎ zhōng cúnzài de wèntí jí duìcè yánjiū (我国税务执法中存
在的问题及对策研究) [Enforcement of Tax Problems and Countermeasures: Research on Problems and 
Countermeasures in China Tax Administration], CHINA LAW INFO, http://www.cftl.cn/show.asp?a_id=6861 
(last visited October 14, 2013). 
351 Plaintiffs in any tax-related administrative lawsuits should receive heightened protection from 
abuse of power by defendant tax agencies and their related parties.  For instance, if a taxpayer sues a LTB 
and the case is fully adjudicated at the taxpayer’s insistence, the law should require any non-random audits 
of the taxpayer in the following two years to be pre-approved by an independent review body.   
352 See Yuanshen Yuangao Liuyongjian, Yang Feng Su Yuanshen Beigao Guangshan Xian Caizheng 
Ju Shuiwu Zhengshou Xingzheng Jiufen Yi An, (原审原告刘永建、杨锋诉原审被告光山县财政局税务
征收行政纠纷一案) [Liu & Yang v. Guangshan County Finance Department-Retrial], (Henan Guangshan 
County Ct. 2010) (on file with author).  The taxpayers obtained its business opportunity through public 
bidding and were able to prevail in a suit against local government upon retrial. In comparison, the plaintiff 
in Zhoukou Huilin did not comply with the legal procedure in obtaining business and found the law against 
him.   
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especially if the companies expect to operate long-term and face 
unpredictable political support.  As the Chinese economic structure 
transforms and more business entities adopt a long-term time trajectory, law 
will play a more important role in corporate transactions and business 
interactions.   
One may wonder what is holding the tax agents back from excessive 
predatory acts, given their wide discretionary authority and the lack of 
political accountability and judicial supervision.  As noted earlier, hierarchy 
and second-party monitoring institutions play certain role in restraining the 
tax agents.  An equally important factor is the regional competition for 
investments and local leaders’ efforts in generating growth, which is critical 
to their career prospect.353  Due to page limit and the focus of this study, this 
article will not expand on the discussion.  Suffice it to say that empirical 
evidence from this study clearly suggests that the Chinese judiciary plays, at 
most, a marginal role in facilitating tax administration in accordance with 
the law. 
 
B. Administrative Litigation in China 
 
This study also contributes to the literature on administrative litigation 
in China by adding new empirical evidence about the dynamics of suing 
powerful tax agencies.  First, an interesting common feature of the court 
decisions and judgments analyzed in this article is the engagement of legal 
counsel by defendant tax agencies.  As noted earlier, defendant government 
agencies hire lawyers more frequently than the plaintiffs.  With state 
agencies being their major clients, administrative law attorneys, when 
representing the plaintiffs, cannot constantly be zealous guards of their 
client’s legal interests, and may persuade the plaintiffs to settle even when a 
trial would be more beneficial.   Moreover, even though legal representation 
may be responsible for more sophisticated judicial deliberation, it does not 
appear to have significantly improved plaintiffs’ chances of winning.354   
In addition, the study finds certain groups to be exposed to a smaller 
risk of extra-judicial agency retaliation, which is crucial to judicial 
resolution of grievances against government officials in China.  First, there 
                                                      
353 SUSAN H. WHITING, THE CADRE EVALUATION SYSTEM AT THE GRASS ROOTS: THE PARADOX OF 
PARTY RULE, IN HOLDING CHINA TOGETHER: DIVERSITY AND NATIONAL INTEGRATION IN THE POST-DENG 
ERA (Barry J. Naughton & Dali L. Yang eds., 2004). 
354 See Ji Li, supra note 9, at 31. The marginal role and effect of lawyers in representing the plaintiffs’ 
interests is consistent with an earlier empirical study finding that lawyer density has negative impact on the 
rate of administrative lawsuits in China.  However, such a conclusion should be viewed with caution 
because tried cases differ systemically from the settled ones. 
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appears to be an emerging group of urban residents, professional 
whistleblowers, who frequently use the judiciary for personal gain.  
Compared to an average Chinese, they file significantly more administrative 
lawsuits. 355   The cases analyzed in this article suggest that such profit-
motivated administrative litigation may have some positive effects on 
rationalizing local governance.  However, because lawsuits filed by the 
whistleblowers are driven mainly by profits, their subject matter is limited to 
disclosure of government-held information critical to the calculation of their 
rewards.  None of the lawsuits will likely lead to more judicial oversight of 
powerful state agencies when their core interests are at stake.   
Immunity to agency retaliation may also come from limited future 
interaction.  Both high population mobility and agency specialization create 
more one-time interactions between residents and a specific agency.  
Therefore, we will likely observe a growing number of administrative 
lawsuits as a result of the economic development and accelerating 
urbanization in China.   
Parties to disputes with government officials may also be relatively 
immune to extra-judicial retaliation if they have ample political resources.356  
Though local courts exhibit strong judicial bias in favor of defendant state 
agencies, they face heightened pressure to be impartial when the plaintiffs 
have powerful allies within the political system.  In such situations, judges 
will often stay close to the law to mitigate the risk of being punished post-
trial by the losing party.  For this reason, decentralization of political power 
will provide a more benign environment for the adjudication of 
administrative lawsuits. 
 
C. The Trial Selection Theories 
 
The findings of this study also contribute to the literature on the 
selection of cases for trial.  As noted earlier, the Priest/Klein model predicts 
a central tendency for the plaintiffs to achieve a win rate of 50% in tried 
cases, and that most tried cases are “close cases.”  The asymmetric 
                                                      
355 Renleliang Su Zhengzhou Shi Guojia Shuiwu Ju Jicha Ju Buluxing Fading Zhize Yi An Yishen 
Xingzheng Panjueshu (任乐亮诉郑州市国家税务局稽查局不履行法定职责一案一审行政判决书) [Ren 
v. Zhengzhou STB Investigation Bureau], (Henan Zhengzhou 27 District Ct. 2012) (on file with author). 
356 Shangsu Ren Nanyang Shi Guojia Shuiwu Ju Yin Yishen Yuangao Shanghai Dazhong Qiche 
Nanyang Xiaoshou Fuwu Youxian Gongsi Su Yishen Beigao Nanyang Shi Guojia Shuiwu Ju Shuiwu 
Xingzheng Chuli Chufa Jiufen Yi An Ershen Xingzheng Panjueshu (上诉人南阳市国家税务局因一审原
告上海大众汽车南阳销售服务有限公司诉一审被告南阳市国家税务局税务行政处理、处罚纠纷一案
二审行政判决书) [Nanyang STB v. Shanghai Dazhong Auto Nanyang Sales and Service Ltd.], (Henan 
Nanyang Intermediate Ct. 2009) (on file with author). 
110 PACIFIC RIM LAW & POLICY JOURNAL VOL. 23 NO. 1 
 
information theory, in contrast, predicts that only cases where the informed 
defendant expects to prevail will go to trial.  The empirical findings of this 
study, though limited by the small sample size and possible missing cases, 
are consistent with the asymmetric information theory.  In addition, the 
asymmetric information model better reflects the real world situation in 
China.  
Though the asymmetric information theory predicts a win rate that 
approximates the empirical finding of this article, the interpretation of the 
logic has to be adjusted to the context of Chinese judicial politics.  The 
original model implicitly treats the court’s decision standard, even if biased, 
as an exogenous factor against which the parties apply their facts.357  When 
applied to administrative lawsuits in China, however, the model should 
incorporate the fact that the decision standard is often a variable of the 
power balance between the two parties.  So instead of the informed 
defendant knowing the cases he will win and selecting them for trial as 
prescribed by the original model, the defendant government officials in 
China, when sued, may refuse to settle for various non-judicial reasons and 
then press the local court to render them a favorable verdict.  In other words, 
existing models based on litigation experiences in the United States or other 
countries with an independent judiciary are over-simplified and insufficient 
if applied directly to the Chinese context or the context of another country 
with a dependent judiciary, such as Vietnam.358  In addition to asymmetric 
information, the model should incorporate asymmetric political power 
between the disputants to be a more useful analytical tool for research on 




By reviewing all tax-related administrative lawsuits in Henan from 
2009 to 2011, this study unveils a few reasons for the puzzling persistence of 
                                                      
357 Lucian A. Bebchuk, Litigation and Settlement under Imperfect Information, 15 RAND J. OF ECON. 
404, 406 (1984). 
358 An empirical study of selected civil cases in China also finds inconsistencies with the Priest/Klein 
prediction. See  Yingmao Tang & Liugang Sheng, 中国司法执行难的计量分析” [A Quantitative Study of 
the Difficulties in the Enforcement of Court Judgment in China], 4法律和社会科学[LAW AND SOC. SCI.] 
1(2011). 
359  While such efforts by the SCP and regional high courts to publish court decisions are 
commendable, it should be made clear that tried cases are not a representative sample of all lawsuits.  For 
lawsuits against government officials, the high win rate for the defendants renders the disclosure of court 
decisions less useful as clarification of ambiguities and conflicts in legal authorities, deterrence for future 
violations by defendant agencies, or encouragement for more administrative lawsuits.   To achieve such 
policy goals, settled cases need also be disclosed to the public. 
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some lawsuits against powerful agencies in China.  Individuals and 
companies with limited extractable resources, powerful allies in government, 
and substantial stake in litigation are more inclined to sue, especially when 
transaction costs of alternative resolution are high.   
This article adopts an institutional rational choice approach, taking 
into consideration the political and legal contexts in exploring how Chinese 
resolve their disputes against powerful state agencies.  This approach has its 
obvious limitations.  For instance, not all aggrieved parties sue for material 
interests.  An earlier study suggested that some plaintiffs in China will invest 
much more in an administrative lawsuit than they expect to receive if 
prevail.360  Several of the disclosed lawsuits against tax agencies also suggest 
factors beyond expected costs and benefits in the persistence to sue.   
In Li v. Luohe STB, for example, the plaintiff litigated repeatedly at 
the trial and appellate level against local STB bureau for an insubstantial 
amount of vehicle tax.361  After the appellate court upheld the trial court 
decision,362 the plaintiff filed another complaint over the same dispute, with 
slightly different wording.363  The trial court refused to docket the case.  The 
plaintiff, instead of accepting the ruling and paying the deficiency, appealed 
the decision.  The appellate court affirmed the trial court holding yet again.  
The tax deficiency could hardly justify the efforts by the plaintiff.   
In addition to the limitations of the theoretical approach, the small size 
and the regional restriction of the sample cases caution broad and definitive 
conclusions.  Though the cases analyzed in the article should represent the 
pool of tried administrative lawsuits against tax agencies in Henan Province, 
it is possible that omissions and errors in publishing the court decisions and 
judgments will cause biases in the sample, especially if the omissions are 
systematic, e.g., judgments against tax agencies were excluded.  But even if 
the biases lower the plaintiffs’ win-rates, the rate for the unbiased sample 
will probably remain low given the current basis of zero.    
                                                      
360 Qinghua Wang, supra note 9, at 532. 
361 Lijunan Su Luohe Shi Guoshui Ju Xingzheng Bu Zuowei Shangsu Yi An Ershen Xingzheng 
Caiding Shu (李军安诉漯河市国税局行政不作为上诉一案二审行政裁定书) [Li v. Luohe STB-Appeal], 
Luohe City Intermediate Ct. 2009) (on file with author).  
362 Lijūn'ān su luòhé shì guóshuì jú xíngzhèng bù zuòwéi shàngsù yī àn èrshěn xíngzhèng cáidìng shū 
(李军安诉漯河市国税局行政不作为上诉一案二审行政裁定书) [Li v. Luohe STB Appeal],  (Luohe City 
Intermediate Court) (on file with author). 
363 Lijunan Bufu Yan Chengqu Renmin Fayuan (2011) Yan Xing Chu Zi di 38 Hao Bu Yu Shouli 
Qisu Xingzheng Caiding Shangsu Yi An Ershen Xingzheng Caiding Shu (李军安不服郾城区人民法院
（2011）郾行初字第 38 号不予受理起诉行政裁定上诉一案二审行政裁定书 ) [Li for Case 
Registration], (2009) (on file with author).  
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In comparison, extending the findings to other provinces may be more 
problematic.  Though Henan Province is arguably representative of China in 
many aspects, such as its population size, there remains significant regional 
variation in administrative litigation.364  Once other provincial high courts 
begin to implement the SPC policies on judgment disclosure, more cross-
regional data will be available, the study of which should make the findings 
of this study more robust to various regional differences.  Furthermore, the 
arguments presented in this study will be greatly strengthened if they can be 
evaluated against cases where parties opt not to sue tax agencies even 
though all the conditions described above are satisfied.   
In spite of these limitations, the study presents a comprehensive and 
in-depth analysis of a relatively unbiased sample of administrative cases 
against a powerful agency in China.  Theories derived from the study should 
be applicable to administrative litigation in other areas.  Factors that enable 
Chinese citizens to sue a powerful agency should have even strong effects 
on lawsuits against less powerful ones.  For instance, it should not be a 
surprise to find professional whistleblowers sue an environmental protection 
agency (a weak government agency) in China for information disclosure or 
nonfeasance, if their income depends on the disputed agency performance.  
The findings of this study make valuable contributions to our knowledge 
about tax administration, administrative litigation and trial selection in the 
Chinese context.  
 
 
                                                      
364  See Ji Li, supra note 9, at 12. 
